ARPANSA - Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency

John Loy - CEO ARPANSA November 9, 2001

Introduction

A basic requirement for the CEO of ARPANSA in assessing whether to issue a licence in relation to a nuclear facility is 'whether the information establishes that the proposed conduct can be carried out without undue risk to the health and safety of people, and to the environment.' In the case of the proposed replacement research reactor, this requirement leads to assessment of the normal operation of the facility and to the analysis of possible accidents arising from internal or external events as set out in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.

One class of 'external event' that does need to be considered is the possibility of sabotage including a direct attack upon the reactor. The need for a security plan has always been one of ARPANSA's expectations in considering licence applications and the issue was addressed in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. The terrible events of 11 September have thrown this set of possibilities into stark relief and require that the relevant issues be thoroughly reviewed before a decision is made with regard to a licence to construct the replacement research reactor. Consequently, I am setting out the steps ARPANSA is taking to assure itself that the physical protection and security arrangements in relation to the proposed replacement research reactor are appropriate.

Role of the Australian Safeguards and Non Proliferation Office (ANSO)and the Australian Intelligence Community

Arising from Australia's international obligations, ASNO requires and inspects arrangements to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material (including fissionable material such as is contained in reactor fuel) and nuclear facilities (including reactors) against theft or sabotage. Thus, ANSTO is required to have permits from ASNO to possess such material and facilities and needs to demonstrate adequate physical protection and security arrangements. ASNO consequently has developed considerable expertise in security arrangements through both its domestic nuclear security regulatory role and its involvement in the development and maintenance of international nuclear security arrangements.

ARPANSA and ASNO recognise that they must share responsibility for evaluation of physical protection and security arrangements for the proposed replacement research reactor. Last year the Director General of ASNO and I concluded a memorandum of understanding about the respective roles of the two agencies and, in May this year, we updated it in relation to the replacement reactor.

The agencies within the Australian intelligence community are charged with advising on threat assessments for nuclear material and facilities, both on the broad 'design basis' threat that should be considered in the design and on any specific threat that may exist at a point in time.

Current Review Activities

ARPANSA has formally requested ANSTO to review and provide to it an assessment of the potential sabotage or terrorist targets within the proposed replacement reactor facility, and the consequences of successful attacks on these targets. The assessment is to include examination of the irradiation and experimental facilities and the consequences of the impact of a large commercial aircraft on the facility. This site assessment for the replacement reactor will be fully reviewed by ARPANSA and then made available to ASNO.

The 'design basis threat' and the reviewed site assessment of potential targets will form the basis for evaluating the adequacy of the physical protection and security arrangements.

In addition, ARPANSA has called for an assessment by ANSTO of the potential physical damage and radiological consequences of acts of sabotage or terrorism, including the impact of a large commercial aircraft hitting the facility. That assessment will also be fully reviewed by ARPANSA and evaluated as a part of the safety evaluation report provided to me.

Steps are thus being taken to ensure that the physical protection and security arrangements are fully reviewed and are put on as sound a basis as possible. In addition, the consequence analysis will be vital in determining whether the outcome of an act of terrorism or sabotage is tolerable.

ARPANSA will also remain informed of international developments in regard to the protection of nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency is reviewing its programs in the light of the new security environment.

I recognise that this is an issue of considerable public interest and that people will want to be re-assured that all reasonable steps have been taken and an effective process is being followed. It would, of course, be self-defeating for substantial aspects of the physical protection and security arrangements to be available to the public as this could increase the likelihood of any sabotage attack succeeding or result in more severe consequences. Detailed information about potential targets for the reactor facility and the security measures protecting them must be treated as highly confidential. Nevertheless, as the process is continued, I will review, together with ASNO and the intelligence agencies, what information can be provided to assure the public that the issues are being addressed.

I would expect that at least the outcomes of the site assessment including analyses of the consequences of acts of sabotage could be made public.

Existing Facilities

The applications for licence still under consideration, and any new applications, will be assessed in the light of these outcomes. Where licences have been issued, the safety of facilities is subject to ongoing review and audit by ARPANSA. Any changes to safety arrangements or modifications to the facilities that I consider are necessary as a result of the new security assessment would be required under additional conditions of licence that I would impose.

The image was provided by ANSTO.

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