ARPANSA coordinates comments on behalf of Australia on IAEA draft documents. We provide feedback to the IAEA through Safety Standards Committee members.
ARPANSA requests comments on drafts in relation to:
The purpose of SSG-27 is to provide recommendations on how to meet the specific safety requirements for ensuring subcriticality when dealing with fissile material in the handling, processing, storage, transport and disposal of these materials and for planning the response to criticality accidents.
ARPANSA uses the guide for assessment of new applications to licence nuclear installations and applications to make relevant changes . The guidelines are incorporated into the ARPANSA performance objectives and criteria which are applied during facility inspections.
The revision of SSG-27 will take into consideration the following:
More specifically, amendments of the guide are needed to address the following:
Standardize background, objective and scope. The background, objective and scope need to be clearly specified.
Check consistency and adequacy with SSR-4.
Include information to clarify:
The following should be made consistent with SSR-4: terminology introduced by SSR-4 (credible abnormal conditions, conditions included in the design); the definition of concept of defence in depth; the definition of safety functions; safety classification; operational limits and conditions, design extension conditions; classification and qualification of items important to safety.
SSR-4, Requirements 38 and 66 on design for criticality safety and criticality control in operation should be addressed fully including:
Add guidance on the implementation of following requirements in relation to criticality safety:
The guidance on means of measurements and evaluation of associated uncertainties should be made consistent with SSR-4.
Make SSG-27 the basic document for the criticality control programme with other SSG’s addressing specific criticality issues.
Consider additional guidance where appropriate on the following for each practice:
Expand subsection related to uranium enrichment and conversion facilities and add clarification on implementation of para 9.88b of SSR-4 on preventing criticality during the cleaning of equipment and cylinders.
Consider additional guidance on false alarm of criticality detection and alarm systems.
ARPANSA will compile all comments prior to providing the national input to the IAEA. Please use the comment template provided to have your say. You may use the online webform available below or submit the form via e-mail to stakeholdercommentarpansa.gov.au.
Comments will be accepted until 15 May 2020.
View draft documents on the IAEA website:
Download draft template for comments:
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