



Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency assessment of the Australian Submarine Agency licence application to construct the Controlled Industrial Facility at Garden Island, WA

Background

The Australian Submarine Agency (ASA) submitted a licence application to the CEO of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) on 6 December 2024. The application sought permission to construct a facility known as the 'Controlled Industrial Facility' (CIF). The facility is intended to provide low level waste management and maintenance support to the Submarine Rotational Force – West (SRF–West) program at the existing HMAS *Stirling* navy base on Garden Island in Western Australia.

The ASA's CIF is subject to the *Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998* (ARPANS Act) until the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator (ANNPSR) is established, which is expected on 1 November 2025.

ARPANSA's role covers the protection of people and the environment from the harmful effects of radiation. It does not extend to socio-economic, health or environmental impacts unrelated to radiation.

Decision to invite public comment

The proposed levels of radioactivity to be managed in the CIF are significantly less than those prescribed in the *Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Regulations 2018* (ARPANS Regulations) for a nuclear installation and, as such, the type of licence required is classified as a prescribed radiation facility. There is no requirement for ARPANSA to conduct public consultation for a prescribed radiation facility. However, the CEO has elected to seek public comment for this licence application due to the level of public interest in the facility.


The CEO of ARPANSA invited public submissions on the proposed facility between 11 June and 17 July 2025. The CEO also held an online information session on the regulatory assessment of the licence application on 2 July 2025, which the Australian Submarine Agency and the Department of Defence's Nuclear Power Safety Regulatory Design Team (NPSRD) also participated in. The information session provided an opportunity for members of the public and other interested stakeholders to attend and ask questions related to the radiological safety of the proposed CIF.

ARPANSA received 93 public submissions relating to this licence application from interested groups, businesses and individuals, the majority of whom reported their location as within the local community in Western Australia.

ARPANSA wishes to thank the individuals and organisations for the time and effort taken in expressing their views on the application by the ASA. This consultation supports ARPANSA's informed decision-making and the input from members of the public and other stakeholders is greatly valued.

The licence application

The ARPANS Act and ARPANS Regulations require a staged licensing approach, which is in line with international best practice and allows for continuous regulatory oversight over the full life cycle of a facility. A new licence application is required for each stage of a facility. The licence application for each stage needs to be forward looking and contain sufficient information on the radiological safety aspects of subsequent stages to allow the CEO to make an informed decision. The key stages are siting, construction, operation and decommissioning as shown below, and are undertaken in that order.



This licence application is the **second** of the staged licence applications to be submitted for this facility, for construction. The siting licence application was approved in July 2024 and information on this decision can be found on the ARPANSA [website](#).

ARPANSA confirms that ASA submitted the full suite of licence application documents for a construction licence for a prescribed radiation facility required under the ARPANS Regulations. Details of the required content of these documents and the level of assessment ARPANSA expects from licence applicants to demonstrate radiological safety can be found on the ARPANSA [website](#).

For the consultation, ASA also provided technical summaries of each of the key licence application documents. These documents contain an overview of the facility, its purpose, details of the safety assessments conducted, radiological controls, proposed operations and how it has satisfied ARPANSA's licensing requirements. The summaries can be found on the ARPANSA [website](#).

Consideration of public submissions

ARPANSA seeks to engage with our stakeholders in a balanced and fair way, welcoming all perspectives, while being clear about our role, purpose and independence. We will use insight from our consultations to improve how we work with stakeholders and to encourage our licence applicants and holders to do the same.

We took into account all submissions related to the radiological safety of the CIF in our decision-making process. Our consultation process involves documenting and analysing issues and concerns raised during the consultation and providing a response to demonstrate how relevant submissions were considered in the decision-making process.

In line with previous consultation processes run by ARPANSA and other Australian Government departments, topics raised in the submissions have been grouped into themes, with individual ARPANSA responses in the two tables at the end of this document. Themes allowed us to clearly and completely address the common matters raised in the submissions. This also protects the privacy of individual respondents who do not want to be identifiable from their submissions.

Questions and concerns raised during the online public information session held on the 2 July have also been included in our themed responses below and taken into account in the decision-making process.

Topics raised that relate to the scope of the licence application or ARPANSA's jurisdiction more broadly are addressed in Table 1. ARPANSA acknowledges that a significant proportion of submissions expressed genuine concerns related to areas that fall outside of ARPANSA's jurisdiction and/or were outside of the scope of the licence application. We have responded to these topics in Table 2 by providing guidance on where to seek further information.

ARPANSA also received feedback from some individuals and organisations about our consultation processes and communication. This included comments on the time zone for closure (AEST) for the online public information session held, as well as suggestions for additional promotion and improvement of our online information session. We will take this feedback into consideration for continuous improvement of future regulatory consultation processes.

ARPANSA is continuing to encourage and, where appropriate, support the ASA to undertake a broader program of public and interested stakeholder engagement to assist in addressing the full scope of issues raised by members of the community.

ARPANSA's findings from the licence application assessment

ARPANSA implements a multi layered evaluation and review process to ensure an independent, thorough and comprehensive assessment, that provides confidence in the licence decision making process. The process starts with the primary assessment team who review the whole licence application, along with additional assessors who are subject matter experts in specific necessary fields. These assessments and recommendations are reviewed by multiple executive members, before the Chief Executive Officer, or her delegate, reviews and makes the licence decision. The ARPANSA CEO, or her delegate, will only grant a licence if there is confidence that stringent requirements have been met under the ARPANS Act and

Regulations and that international best practice in radiological protection has been met, and that there is evidence that these requirements can continue to be met throughout the lifecycle of the facility.

For the CIF, additional assessors included subject matter specialists in radioactive waste management, radiological dose modelling and emergency response, radiological security, technical human and organisational factors and radiological protection. For this assessment, ARPANSA's radiological dose modelling experts independently modelled the scenarios in ASA's application to verify the data presented for assessment.

Examples of key requirements that ARPANSA was satisfied of following the regulatory assessment of this licence application included:

- That the strict requirements of the ARPANS Act and ARPANS Regulations have been met and that the facility is in line with international best practice in radiation protection
- That controls will be in place to protect people and the environment and to prevent unplanned release of radioactivity from the facility
- That ASA intend to implement an appropriate environmental radiological monitoring program to provide assurance that there are no releases of radioactivity from the CIF
- That a range of safety assessments have been conducted that demonstrate that even in worst-case accident scenarios, radiation doses to people and the environment (including wildlife) remain below levels of regulatory concern. ARPANSA subject matter experts have independently verified these assessments and are satisfied of their accuracy.

While this is not an exhaustive list, it reflects the level of scrutiny that ARPANSA applies to assessment of licence applications under the ARPANS Act. More information on the regulatory assessment process can be found on the ARPANSA [website](#).

The ARPANSA assessment concluded that the ASA have demonstrated that there will be no harmful effects from radiation to people and the environment (including wildlife) from the proposed CIF. There were no public submissions that showed that these findings were not valid. Therefore, there were no submissions, information obtained, or considerations raised that would justify ARPANSA refusing to issue a construction licence to the ASA. ARPANSA has therefore issued the licence.

Responses to public submissions

Table 1 – Public submissions related to the scope of the licence application/ARPANSA's jurisdiction

No	Public submission theme	ARPANSA response
1.1	Radiological safety of people and the environment.	ARPANSA's regulatory assessment found that ASA has demonstrated that there will be no harm to people or the environment from any potential effects of radiation from the CIF. The assessment addressed issues and concerns raised in the public submissions with the following key findings: • That there will be no harm from the effects of radiation from the CIF to residents of the Rockingham area, Perth or beyond, people on Garden Island, or people engaging in recreational or commercial activities (including swimming, boating, fishing and seafood consumption) • That there will be no harm from the effects of radiation from the CIF to wildlife (both terrestrial and marine creatures) • There are no requirements for hospitals to undergo upgrades for radiological preparedness because of the CIF • That no exclusion zones will be required on or around Garden Island for radiological safety reasons because of the CIF. • That appropriate controls will be in place to protect workers from radiation • That appropriate controls will be in place to prevent unplanned release of radioactivity from the facility • That ASA will implement a radiological environmental monitoring program to provide assurance that there are no unplanned releases of radioactivity from the CIF. Overall, ARPANSA was satisfied that the requirements of the ARPANS Act and ARPANS Regulations to protect people and the environment were met and that there was no radiological safety issues raised in the public submissions that had not been adequately addressed in the licence application.
1.2	Concerns regarding accidents and emergency response requirements.	While ARPANSA requires evidence that controls will be in place to prevent unplanned release of radioactivity from the facility, we also require detailed radiological safety assessments to be conducted that demonstrate that in the unlikely event of worst-case accident scenarios, doses to people and the environment including wildlife, will remain below levels of regulatory concern. The worst-case accident scenarios assessment resulted in: - a negligible dose off-site of HMAS <i>Stirling</i>; and - on site doses well below levels of regulatory concern to people and the environment (including wildlife)

		This analysis was independently verified by ARPANSA subject matter experts and found to be accurate. This means that no emergency precautions or protection for radiological safety would be required for members of the public, including those in Rockingham, Fremantle, the greater Perth region and beyond, because of an incident at the CIF. There would also be no requirement to evacuate HMAS <i>Stirling</i> and/or Garden Island for radiological safety reasons. ARPANSA is satisfied that ASA have demonstrated that there will be appropriate emergency plans in place to safely manage any onsite radiological incident.
1.3	Operational radiological environmental monitoring program and transparency of results.	ARPANSA has required ASA to demonstrate that they will establish an appropriate environmental radiological monitoring program to provide ongoing assurance that no unplanned radioactive releases have occurred from the CIF if an operating licence is approved in the future. ASA has stated that they will make reports covering the results of this monitoring available to the public. ARPANSA required ASA to complete environmental monitoring, to establish baseline radiological conditions of the area where the CIF will be located. The future environmental monitoring program will be based off these observations. The baseline monitoring was conducted by external specialist consultants over an extended period and included real-time monitoring, sampling of both marine and terrestrial environments and area radiation monitoring including public areas. Final details of the radiological environmental monitoring program will be submitted to the new regulator for the CIF, the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator (ANNPSR) as part of any future operations licence application. This will include details of where radiological monitoring will occur including the location of radiation monitors.
1.4	Concerns regarding operational discharges from the CIF.	Low level liquid radioactive waste is proposed to be treated at the CIF in a liquid effluent treatment plant. ARPANSA is satisfied that ASA has demonstrated this plant will be effective and they will have controls in place to ensure the treated effluent will be tested prior to being evaporated, to ensure the radioactivity levels are below regulatory concern. Stack monitoring will also be in place to confirm this. ARPANSA has also required ASA to demonstrate there will be an appropriate radiological environmental monitoring program implemented to provide assurance that there have been no unplanned releases of radioactivity from the facility.
1.5	Site characteristics and external event impact.	ARPANSA is satisfied that ASA has demonstrated that engineered protection for radiological safety has been incorporated into the design, where required. This included addressing site characteristics such as geology, meteorology (e.g. climate change effects and extreme weather) and hydrology (e.g. sea

		level rise and corrosion from sea spray) and safeguarding against external events both human induced and natural (e.g. earthquakes, tsunamis and fire). The results of worst-case accident scenario assessments, which modelled releases of radioactivity from the facility and took into account a range of external events including fire, earthquake and extreme weather resulted in • a negligible dose off-site of HMAS <i>Stirling</i>; and • on site doses well below levels of regulatory concern to people and the environment (including wildlife) This analysis was independently verified by ARPANSA subject matter experts and found to be accurate.
1.6	Transport of waste including concern over potential transport routes.	The construction licence for the CIF does not permit the transport of radioactive waste outside of HMAS <i>Stirling</i>. If, in the future, there is a need to transport radioactive waste, for example as part of end-of-life management of the CIF, a separate licence application would need to be made to the relevant regulators. Since no submission has been made to ARPANSA related to transport of CIF radioactive waste from HMAS <i>Stirling</i>, potential off site transport routes cannot be commented on. However, for movement of the type of low-level waste likely to be present in the CIF, ARPANSA would expect a range of protective controls to be demonstrated before any future transportation would be authorised, including: • use of certified industry standard packages designed to prevent loss of content even in the event of a wide range of accident conditions • appropriate methods of handling and stowage during transit • use of a suitable placard or label on a suitable transport vehicle operated by trained staff • application of security measures to ensure that the waste is accounted for at all times • emergency plans to be in place in case of an accident • use of shielding if required to ensure that the public and environment along all possible transport routes are protected from radiation. Information on the strict requirements for transport of radioactive material in Australia can be found on the ARPANSA website.
1.7	Concerns over length of time of storage of radioactive waste.	Radioactive waste storage at the CIF is only approved for the duration of its design life, which is 40-50 years. We have required ASA to demonstrate that they have adequate plans in place to remove the waste from the CIF as part of the end-of-life management of the facility or before, subject to separate regulatory approval.
1.8	Final disposal pathway of radioactive waste in Australia.	ARPANSA acknowledges that there is currently no identified Commonwealth disposal pathway for radioactive waste in Australia and that radioactive waste storage is only an interim measure. The Australian Government has made a commitment to identify final disposal pathways for Australia's radioactive

		waste, and the Australian Radioactive Waste Agency (ARWA) was established in July 2020. In addition, the Australian Government has made a commitment in relation to the naval nuclear propulsion program, to identify locations that are suitable for disposal of radioactive waste generated by submarines. Given the above government commitments, and ARPANSA's assessment that ASA have demonstrated that people and the environment will be protected from the harmful effects of radiation from the CIF, it is not considered justified to refuse a licence on this basis alone. ARPANSA has not identified any reason to conclude that the waste at the CIF cannot be managed safely over the design life of the facility (40-50 years). It is also noted ASA have contingency plans in place to remove the radioactive waste from the CIF prior to the end of the facility's design life if required.
1.9	Waste inventory including concerns the CIF could accept radiological waste that is not low level in the future.	The facility is licensed to manage low level radioactive waste only from the SRF-West program within the strict activity limits laid out for a prescribed radiation facility under the ARPANS Regulations. It is not permitted to accept intermediate or high-level waste or spent fuel, even in the event of an emergency. A different type of licence or a modification to the licence, would need to be sought and approved by the relevant regulatory authorities for management of waste beyond the current activity limits for a prescribed radiation facility.
1.10	ARPANSA's competence to regulate radioactive waste facilities.	ARPANSA has the capability, experience and resources required to regulate radioactive waste facilities and currently regulates many such facilities. ARPANSA ensures it has qualified staff to support its regulatory functions through strategic workforce planning, including recruitment, retention and succession planning of suitably qualified and experienced personnel. Regulatory staff undergo and pass mandatory training, based on international best practice in regulatory competence, to be appointed as an inspector. The regulatory workforce training includes a mix of technical disciplines, regulatory practices and interpersonal skills. Ongoing training and development are offered in technical and interpersonal skills, along with international collaboration opportunities, to maintain and develop staff expertise. The agency maintains an effective organisational structure that supports high-quality regulatory outputs and manages any potential conflicts of interest. Regulatory decisions and licence application assessments undergo peer, management and legal review. The CEO of ARPANSA is advised by three statutory advisory bodies and may seek independent advice via contractual arrangements from third parties with relevant expertise, while ensuring that any conflicts of interest are identified and addressed during those processes.

1.11	Independence of ARPANSA from Department of Defence.	ARPANSA is independent from the Department of Defence. ARPANSA sits within the Health portfolio and reports to the Assistant Minister for Health and Aged Care. The CEO of ARPANSA is an independent statutory authority. ARPANSA's regulatory and scientific decisions are established independently in accordance with the ARPANS Act. The CEO of ARPANSA is the accountable authority for regulatory decisions. The Minister for Health, Disability and Ageing does not direct ARPANSA's regulatory decisions. While operationally and functionally independent, ARPANSA reports quarterly to, and is accountable to, the Australian Parliament and is subject to scrutiny by various Committees of the Parliament and audit by the Australian National Audit Office. ARPANSA also invites international reviews of its practices such as the recent IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service, the results of which can be seen on the ARPANSA website.
1.12	Concerns around the misrepresentation of the type of waste to be managed at the CIF.	As the independent regulator, ARPANSA is responsible for verifying the accuracy of information submitted as part of a licence application. ARPANSA is satisfied that no inaccurate statements or misrepresentation has been made concerning the waste type in the licence application documents or in the documents that ASA provided for public consultation.
1.13	Questions regarding security requirements for the CIF.	ARPANSA is satisfied that the security plans and arrangements submitted by ASA appropriately address requirements for radiological security and comply with the Australian Code of Practice for the Security of Radioactive Sources , which is based on international best practice.
1.14	The information released for public comment, including requests for detailed information regarding the facility design.	When seeking public comment, ARPANSA typically releases public components or details of a licence application with the permission of the licence applicant. Some licence documents must be heavily redacted or cannot be published at all for security or commercial-in-confidence reasons. As the proposed site is an operational military navy base, and the proposed operations will interface with vessels owned and operated by AUKUS partner nations, there are constraints on ASA regarding what information they are permitted to release. ARPANSA has aimed to balance the restrictions placed on ASA with the decision to consult the public regarding this licence application. ARPANSA strongly encouraged ASA to provide more information for public comment than was made available for the siting licence stage for the CIF. For this consultation they have provided significantly more documentation including technical summaries of each of the key licence application documents. These documents contain an overview of the facility, its purpose, details of the safety assessments conducted, radiological controls, proposed operations and how it has satisfied ARPANSA's licensing requirements. While the summary documents are not as comprehensive as information released in some other ARPANSA licence consultations, they provide an appropriate and accurate summary of the proposed facility and licence requirements to allow external stakeholders to make comment. Requests for information such as the detailed design of the CIF or for specific licence application documents should be directed to the ASA.

1.15	Questions regarding construction schedules for the CIF and details of contractors used.	Questions regarding construction and contractor details should be directed to the ASA .
1.16	Request for clarification regarding ARPANSA's import permit process for radioactive waste.	Information on import permits required for non-medical radioactive substances can be found on the ARPANSA website . A visiting nuclear-powered submarine to HMAS <i>Stirling</i> will be expected to apply to ARPANSA for import permits for radioactive waste, if a future operations licence is granted for this facility.
1.17	Questions regarding the scope of the construction licence in terms of permitting radioactive waste to be handled at the CIF.	The construction licence does not permit the management or storage of radioactive waste at the CIF. Such activity would need to be separately authorised by an operating licence for the CIF.
1.18	Questions around when a licence holder wants to make a change to what is approved.	The term for this is change control, full details on when a licence applicant must seek approval to make a change with significant implications for safety can be found on the ARPANSA website . The draft ANNPS Regulations have a similar requirement.
1.19	Questions regarding the application of dose limits and monitoring programs.	ARPANSA can confirm that the ASA will apply the dose limits for occupationally exposed persons and the public in line with the requirements of the ARPANSA Code for Radiation Protection in Planned Exposure Situations and plan to implement appropriate operational programs for dose monitoring.
1.20	Concerns over future regulatory oversight of the CIF.	The construction licence for the CIF will be transferred to ANNPSR on 1 November 2025 and any licence application for a future operating licence for the CIF would be made to this regulatory body. ANNPSR will therefore be responsible for the regulatory oversight of the CIF after 1 November. The facility would not be subject to regulation by foreign regulators. More information on the draft regulatory framework for ANNPSR can be found on the Department of Defence website . The construction licence for the CIF will transfer to ANNPSR under transitional arrangements on 1 November 2025.
1.21	Justification for the CIF.	Under the ARPANS regulations a licence applicant must provide net benefit/justification for proposed facilities. The justification provided for the CIF by the ASA is that the facility will support the Submarine Rotational Force West initiative, which will help Australia build the necessary operational capabilities and skills to be sovereign-ready to own, operate and maintain a fleet of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines from the early 2030s.

Table 2 – Public submissions related to issues outside the scope of the licence application and/or outside of ARPANSA’s remit.

No	Public submission theme	ARPANSA response
2.1	Concerns regarding the choice of location for the CIF.	ARPANSA has no role in the identification or selection of potential sites for storage of radioactive waste. Our role is to assess whether people and the environment can be protected from the harmful effects of radiation from proposed facilities. For more information regarding site selection, please contact the ASA .
2.2	Concerns regarding acceptance of foreign radioactive waste.	ARPANSA cannot comment on any government policy decision related to acceptance of foreign radioactive waste. For more information, please contact the Department of Defence .
2.3	The safety and operations of visiting nuclear-powered submarines.	ARPANSA does not regulate visiting nuclear-powered submarines. The Australian government’s Visiting Ships Panel (Nuclear) is a Defence-led, cross-government panel that oversees visits to Australian ports by nuclear-powered vessels. ARPANSA is a member of this panel in an advisory capacity and more information can be found on our website. This group has established procedures to ensure the public and the environment’s safety during visits from nuclear-powered vessels, including submarines. These procedures include conditions of entry to the port, radiation monitoring, and contingency arrangements in the unlikely event of an incident resulting in the release of radioactivity to the environment. The Western Australia State Emergency Plan for visits by nuclear-powered submarines to Western Australian ports can be viewed on the WA State government website.
2.4	Concern that the ARPANSA visiting nuclear powered vessel information page has only published radiological monitoring for visits up until 2022.	ARPANSA publishes environmental monitoring reports for visiting ships on behalf of the Department of Defence. The 2023 and 2024 reports are under review and will be released once approved. For more information, please contact the Department of Defence.
2.5	Questions regarding visiting submarine maintenance.	The Department of Defence have stated that only in-water maintenance will occur as part of the SRF-West initiative. For more information on visiting submarine maintenance please contact the Department of Defence .
2.6	Concern that establishment of the SRF-West program could result in targeting by adverse military forces.	ARPANSA cannot comment on decisions regarding the establishment or location of the SRF-West initiative, nor military threats. The establishment of SRF-West is a government policy decision, and enquiries should be directed to the Department of Defence .

2.7	Establishment of the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine program.	ARPANSA cannot comment on the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine program because it is a government policy decision. Concerns should be directed to the ASA .
2.8	Questions regarding prohibitions on nuclear activities in Australia.	There are two federal laws, the <i>Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999</i> and the <i>Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998</i> that prohibit nuclear power stations and certain nuclear fuel cycle related facilities. Additionally, individual states and territories have laws that separately prohibit certain nuclear activities. Facilities such as the proposed CIF are not part of this ban and are not banned in Western Australia. More information on current prohibitions on nuclear activities in Australia can be found on the Parliament of Australia website .
2.9	Questions regarding nuclear liability.	Questions regarding liability for damage should be directed to the Department of Defence .
2.10	Potential impacts of the proposed facility that fall outside of ARPANSA's jurisdiction.	These questions should be directed to the relevant authority. For example, questions regarding the assessment of non-radiological environmental, cultural heritage and socio economic impact should be directed to the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW). Information on a referral recently made to this department, which covers the whole of the infrastructure upgrades at HMAS <i>Stirling</i> from the SRF-West Initiative can be found on the DCCEEW website. ARPANSA remains committed to working with other regulators, as appropriate, to ensure effective interfaces that allow us to continue to ensure independent regulation of radiological and nuclear safety. ARPANSA will encourage ASA to note the topics of feedback in this consultation and to take appropriate action to address public concern and interest as part of their ongoing stakeholder engagement.
2.11	The independence and regulatory framework of the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator (ANNPSR).	Questions on the independence and regulatory framework of ANNPSR should be directed to the Department of Defence . Information on the draft ANNPS regulations, which include provision for compliance, inspection and enforcement of facilities such as the CIF can also be found on the Department of Defence website .
2.12	Questions regarding construction schedule for the proposed CIF and for details of any contractors used.	Questions regarding construction and contractor details should be directed to the ASA .
2.13	Concerns around the safety of radioactive material transport due to the 2023 lost radioactive source in West Australia.	The source was lost by a mining company, which is regulated by the state regulator – the Radiological Council of Western Australia and not ARPANSA. Information regarding the event, the results of the detailed investigation and the improvements that were required to be made by the mining company to its transport processes as a result, can be obtained from the Radiological Council of WA .

		See response to Table 1 item 1.6 for more information on regulatory approvals required for transport of radioactive material. The CIF construction licence does not permit transport of radioactive waste. If waste is required to be moved, for example as part of end-of-life management of the CIF, separate approval must be sought from the appropriate regulatory authorities.
2.14	Concerns regarding the Department of Defence's public engagement regarding the SRF-West initiative, AUKUS program and the CIF.	Questions and concerns regarding the Department of Defence's public consultation processes should be directed to the ASA .
2.15	Concerns regarding the prevention of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of the facility by the Department of Defence.	The IAEA has conducted safeguard inspection activities at HMAS <i>Stirling</i> and plan to conduct further inspections as part of the significant increase in IAEA verification activities across Australia since AUKUS was announced. For information regarding IAEA inspections for the CIF, please contact the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office .

ARPANSA notes that there were a range of concerns raised and will encourage ASA to note the topics of feedback in this consultation and take appropriate action to address public concern as part of their ongoing stakeholder engagement.