Regulatory Guide – How to determine whether a UV source is a controlled apparatus (ARPANSA-GDE-1747)

 

1. Purpose

This document is provided to assist controlled persons to determine whether an ultraviolet (UV) source is classed as controlled apparatus under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (the Act). In particular, it clarifies the conditions specified in section 9 of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Regulations 2018 (the Regulations). A number of case studies where typical UV emitting apparatus have been assessed in accordance with this guide have been published in the document UV emitting apparatus – case studies.

This document is valid for both pulsed and continuous sources of UV radiation where the exposure duration is not less than 0.1 ms. It does not apply to UV lasers. Exposure to lasers are covered by laser standard AS/NZS IEC 60825.1 Safety of laser products.

Reference documents

Radiation Protection Standard for Occupational Exposure to Ultraviolet Radiation (2006), ARPANSA Radiation Protection Series No. 12 (RPS 12). Extracts from this document can be found in Appendix 1.

To fulfil the requirements of section 2.1 of RPS 12 supplementary information and management plans for controlling exposure to UVR can be found on the ARPANSA website:

Read this document in conjunction with Regulatory Guide: UV emitting apparatus case studies.

2. Definitions

Exposure limit: the exposure which it is believed that nearly all workers can be repeatedly exposed to without adverse effect (exposure limits for UV are given in Schedule 1 of RPS 12).

Note: The exposure limits apply to artificial sources of UVR. Due to highly variable ambient solar UVR levels the application of exposure limits is not practical and limiting solar UVR exposure to as low as possible is the most effective approach.

Permissible exposure time, tPET: the time it takes to reach the exposure limit (calculated according to Schedule 1 of RPS 12).

3. Controlled apparatus

In section 4 Group 1 table of the Regulations defines an optical source, other than a laser product, emitting ultraviolet radiation, infrared or visible light as controlled apparatus.

4. Criteria to be satisfied

Section 9 of the Regulations consists of two separate criteria, both of which must be fulfilled for the apparatus to be classed as controlled apparatus.

The first criterion, paragraph 9(1)(b) concerns source emission. It is fulfilled if the apparatus produces non-ionising radiation that could lead to a person being exposed to radiation levels exceeding the non-ionizing radiation exposure limits. For UVR the relevant standard referred to in section 4 is Radiation Protection Standard for Occupational Exposure to Ultraviolet Radiation (2006), ARPANSA Radiation Protection Series No. 12 (RPS 12).

The second criterion, paragraph 9(1)(c) is based on the accessibility of the source. Factors determining whether radiation above the exposure limits is accessible to persons have to be evaluated. The condition is fulfilled if excess levels of radiation are readily accessible to persons in any of the following situations:

  • in the course of intended operations or procedures of the apparatus; or
  • as a result of a reasonably foreseeable abnormal event involving the apparatus; or
  • as a result of a reasonably foreseeable single element failure of the apparatus; or
  • without the use of tools or other specialised equipment required to remove protective barriers or access panels.

If the apparatus is not one of the exempt dealings in section 44(7) of the Regulations the procedure in the next section describes how to go through these two criteria to determine whether a UVR source is classed as controlled apparatus or not.

5. Procedure

This procedure (as show by the flow chart on page 4) will assist you to determine whether your apparatus is controlled or not. 

  1. If the apparatus is a transilluminator or germicidal lamp where the emission is accessible, it is classed as controlled apparatus.
  2. If the apparatus is a fluorescence microscope, a spectrophotometer or a high-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) where the light source is completely enclosed, it is not controlled apparatus.
  3. If there is a reasonably foreseeable abnormal event involving the apparatus that would lead to a person being exposed to levels above the exposure limits, the apparatus is classed as controlled apparatus. Examples of this are: forgetting or using the wrong PPE, possible exposure during normal maintenance, not using prescribed shielding to cover a sample, easy overriding of an interlock etc.
  4. If there is a reasonably foreseeable single element failure of the apparatus that would lead to a person being exposed to levels above the exposure limits, the apparatus is classed as controlled apparatus. An example of this is a malfunctioning interlock. A failsafe interlock would not lead to a person being exposed as no UVR is emitted if the interlock fails.
  5. If a person can receive excess levels of radiation when removing protective barriers or access panels that do not require the use of tools or other specialised equipment, then the apparatus is classed as controlled apparatus.
  6. Determine if the source emits UV radiation that could lead to a person being exposed to radiation levels in excess of the exposure limits in the course of intended operations or procedures. Calculate the permissible exposure time, tPET, according to the method described in Schedule 1 of RPS 12.

Notes:

The distance to the source when the unit is in operation should be taken into account. Using the inverse square law the radiation level is calculated at the position where the closest person is situated. If the unit is handheld and no distances are specified: assume that the skin and eyes are 20 cm and 50 cm, respectively, from the source.

Embedded devices can be designed in such a way that it can be considered safe for their intended use and during normal operation as the emission hazard only becomes accessible during service or maintenance. i.e. protective housing, interlocks and other organisational safety measures. The servicing of embedded UV sources can increase the risk of injury as the servicing may include various adjustments. To carry out servicing in a safe manner it may be necessary to implement temporary procedures and safeguards appropriate to the increased level of risk. Manufacturers may provide advice on safe procedures during servicing and maintenance.

Compare with the maximum exposure duration, texp.

If  texp> t PET  the apparatus is classed as controlled apparatus.

If      the apparatus is not classed as controlled apparatus.

Flowchart for determining whether a UV source is a controlled apparatus

 

Flowchart for determining whether a UV source is a controlled apparatus

Appendix 1

Extracts from Schedule 1 Radiation Protection Standard for Occupational Exposure to Ultraviolet Radiation (2006)

Radiation Protection Series No. 12

Exposure Limits (EL) for UVR from Artificial Sources 1

S1.1 The EL for occupational exposure to UVR incident upon the skin or eye where irradiance values are known and the exposure duration is controlled are as below. Note that S1.2 and S1.3 must both be satisfied independently.
S1.2   For the UV-A spectral region 315 to 400 nm, the total radiant exposure on the unprotected eye must not exceed 10 kJ.m–2 within an 8 hour period and the total 8 hour radiant exposure incident on the unprotected skin must not exceed the values given in Table 1. Values for the relative spectral effectiveness are given up to 400 nm to expand the action spectrum into the UV-A for determining the EL for skin exposure.
S1.3 In addition, the ultraviolet radiant exposure in the actinic UV spectral region (UV-B and UV-C from 180 to 315 nm) incident upon the unprotected skin and unprotected eye(s) within an 8 hour period must not exceed the values given in Table 1.
S1.4 

For broadband sources emitting a range of wavelengths in the ultraviolet region (ie most UVR sources), determination of the effective irradiance of such a broadband source is done by weighting all wavelengths present in the emission with their corresponding spectral effectiveness by using the following weighting formula:

Eeff       =       ∑Eλ. Sλ. ∆λ

where

Eeff       =       Effective irradiance in W.m–2 (J.s–1.m–2) normalised to a monochromatic source at 270 nm

Eλ              =       Spectral irradiance in W.m–2.nm

Sλ              =       Relative spectral effectiveness (unitless)

λ             =       Bandwidth in nanometres of the calculated or measurement intervals

S1.5  Permissible exposure time in seconds for exposure to actinic UVR incident upon the unprotected skin or eye may be computed by dividing 30 J.m–2 by Eeff in W.m–2. The maximum exposure duration may also be determined using Table 2 of this Schedule which provides representative exposure durations corresponding to effective irradiances in W.m–2 (and μW.cm-2).

1 These exposure limits are intended to be used as guidelines only for Solar UVR exposure.

 

Table 1: Ultraviolet radiation exposure limits and Relative Spectral Effectiveness

Wavelengtha
(nm)

Exposure limit
(J.m-2)

Exposure limit
(mJ.cm-2)

Relative Spectral Effectiveness Sλ

180

2 500

250

0.012

190

1 600

160

0.019

200

1 000

100

0.030

205

590

59

0.051

210

400

40

0.075

215

320

32

0.095

220

250

25

0.120

225

200

20

0.150

230

160

16

0.190

235

130

13

0.240

240

100

10

0.300

245

83

8.3

0.360

250

70

7.0

0.430

254b

60

6.0

0.500

255

58

5.8

0.520

260

46

4.6

0.650

265

37

3.7

0.810

270

30

3.0

1.000

275

31

3.1

0.960

280b

34

3.4

0.880

285

39

3.9

0.770

290

47

4.7

0.640

295

56

5.6

0.540

297b

65

6.5

0.460

300

100

10

0.300

303b

250

25

0.120

305

500

50

0.060

308

1 200

120

0.026

310

2 000

200

0.015

313b

5 000

500

0.006

315

1.0 × 104

1.0 × 103

0.003

316

1.3 × 104

1.3 × 103

0.0024

317

1.5 × 104

1.5 × 103

0.0020

318

1.9 × 104

1.9 × 103

0.0016

319

2.5 × 104

2.5 × 103

0.0012

320

2.9 × 104

2.9 × 103

0.0010

322

4.5 × 104

4.5 × 103

0.00067

323

5.6 × 104

5.6 × 103

0.00054

325

6.0 × 104

6.0 × 103

0.00050

328

6.8 × 104

6.8 × 103

0.00044

330

7.3 × 104

7.3 × 103

0.00041

333

8.1 × 104

8.1 × 103

0.00037

335

8.8 × 104

8.8 × 103

0.00034

340

1.1 × 105

1.1 × 104

0.00028

345

1.3 × 105

1.3 × 104

0.00024

350

1.5 × 105

1.5 × 104

0.00020

355

1.9 × 105

1.9 × 104

0.00016

360

2.3 × 105

2.3 × 104

0.00013

365b

2.7 × 105

2.7 × 104

0.00011

370

3.2 × 105

3.2 × 104

0.000093

375

3.9 × 105

3.9 × 104

0.000077

380

4.7 × 105

4.7 × 104

0.000064

385

5.7 × 105

5.7 × 104

0.000053

390

6.8 × 105

6.8 × 104

0.000044

395

8.3 × 105

8.3 × 104

0.000036

400

1.0 × 106

1.0 × 105

0.000030

a Wavelengths chosen are representative; other values should be interpolated at intermediate wavelengths

b Emission lines of a mercury discharge spectrum

Table 2: Limiting UV exposure durations based on EL 

Duration of exposure per day 

Effective irradiance

Eeff(W.m–2)  |  Eeff (µW.cm–2)

8

hr

0.001

0.1

4

hr

0.002

0.2

2

hr

0.004

0.4

1

hr

0.008

0.8

30

min

0.017

1.7

15

min

0.033

3.3

10

min

0.05

5

5

min

0.1

10

1

min

0.5

50

30

sec

1.0

100

10

sec

3.0

300

1

sec

30

3 000

0.5

sec

60

6 000

0.1

sec

300

30 000

 

Regulatory Guide - How to determine whether a Class 1M or Class 2M laser product is a controlled apparatus (ARPANSA-GDE-1739)

On this page

1. Purpose

This document is provided to assist controlled persons to determine whether a Class 1M and Class 2M source is classed as a controlled apparatus under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (the Act). In particular, it clarifies the conditions used in section 9 of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Regulations 2018 (the Regulations).  

Reference documents

AS/NZS IEC 60825.1 Safety of laser products Part 1: Equipment classification and requirements
AS/NZS IEC 60825.2 Safety of laser products Part 2: Safety of optical fibre communication systems (OFCS) 
AS/NZS IEC 60825.14 Safety of laser products Part 14: A user’s guide

2. Background

There are currently eight classifications for lasers based on the likelihood of injury. The classification of a laser is used to develop safety control measures. The Accessible Emission Limit (AEL) is the maximum accessible emission permitted within a particular class of laser.

In section 44(7) of the Regulations the exempt dealings define a laser as an exempt laser product with an accessible emission that does not exceed the accessible emission limits of a Class 3R laser product, as set out in AS/NZS IEC 60825.1 and an optical fibre communication system that does not exceed the hazard level 3R, as set out in AS/NZS IEC 60825.2.

Therefore, a laser with an AEL greater than the accessible emission limit of a Class 3R laser product is deemed a controlled apparatus and an optical fibre communication system where it exceeds a Hazard Level 3R as a controlled apparatus.

Because the emission level of Class 1M and Class 2M laser products may exceed the AEL for Class 3R, Class 1M and Class 2M lasers are potentially classified as controlled apparatus.

3. Class 1M lasers

A Class 1M laser is any laser product in the wavelength range from 302.5 nm to 4000 nm.

Since Class 1M is assigned to lasers where the exposure would not normally exceed the AEL of Class 1, most Class 1M lasers would not be considered to be a controlled apparatus.

The two notable exceptions to this would be where it is reasonably foreseeable that the beam may be viewed with magnifying optics like a telescope, binoculars or a microscope. Consequently the AEL may be greater than the AEL of a Class 3R laser: 

  1. where the beam is collimated with a large diameter and optics are used to focus the beam, or
  2. where the beam is highly divergent and optics are used near the laser aperture to collimate the beam.

Example: Laser diodes, fibre communication systems.

4. Class 2M lasers

Class 2M laser is any laser product in the wavelength range from 400 nm to 700 nm.

Class 2M applies only to visible lasers and assumes that a degree of protection is afforded by the aversion response (blinking and turning away). In most cases, due to the aversion response, it is not considered reasonably foreseeable that a person would deliberately view the beam for more than 0.25s. The same conditions given for Class 1M lasers apply to Class 2M lasers: unless the beam is viewed with magnifying optics it is not considered to be a controlled apparatus. 

Warning for potential hazard to the skin or eye

If the accessible emission from a Class 1M or Class 2M laser is greater than the AEL of a Class 3R as determined with a 3.5 mm diameter aperture placed at the closest point of human access, an additional warning regarding potential skin hazard and/or anterior parts of the eye hazard must be given. The following additional warning must be given on the device:

 

Warning sign that reads: AVOID EXPOSURE. LASER RADIATION IS EMITTED FROM THIS APERTURE

Hazard level 1M and 2M optical fibre communications systems (OFCS)

Hazard level refers to the potential hazard from laser emissions at any location in an end-to-end fibre optic communication system that may be accessible during use or maintenance or in the event of a failure or fibre disconnection as described in AS/NZS IEC 60825.2. The assessment of the hazard level uses the class AEL described in AS/NZS IEC 60825.1.

Hazard level 1M and Hazard level 2M OFCS may be considered to be controlled if their emission level exceeds the AEL for Class 3R and in the course of intended operations or under a reasonably foreseeable abnormal event, may lead to persons being exposed to emission in excess of the MPE mentioned in AS/NZS IEC 60825.1. Each accessible location in an extended enclosed optical transmission system will be designated by a hazard level as those for classifications in AS/NZS IEC 60825.1 and based on radiation that could become accessible and exceeds the AEL for Class 3R under reasonably foreseeable circumstances such as a fibre cable break or disconnected fibre connector. Labelling and marking requirements can be found in AS/NZS IEC 60825.2.

5. Summary

Class 1M and Class 2M lasers may be considered to be controlled if their emission level exceeds the AEL for Class 3R and in the course of intended operations or under a reasonably foreseeable abnormal event, may lead to persons being exposed to emission in excess of the MPE mentioned in AS/NZS IEC 60825.1. 

For the purposes of determining the hazard level of 1M and 2M optical fibre communications systems, the same rules apply as for Class 1M and 2M lasers.

Regulatory Guide - How to determine whether a RF source is a controlled apparatus (ARPANSA-GDE-1734)

1. Purpose

This document is provided to assist controlled persons to determine whether a radiofrequency (RF) source is classed as a controlled apparatus under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (the Act). In particular, it clarifies conditions and defines terms used in Section 9 of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Regulations 2018 (the Regulations).

2. Controlled apparatus

The Group 1 table in section 4 of the Regulations defines some of the types of RF emitting devices which are classed as controlled apparatus. 

The following are examples of RF devices:

  • a magnetic field non-destructive testing device
  • an induction heater or induction furnace
  • an industrial radiofrequency heater or welder 
  • a radiofrequency plasma tube
  • microwave or radiofrequency diathermy equipment
  • an industrial microwave or radiofrequency processing system

More explanatory examples of the above listed RF emitting devices can be found in Appendix 1.

Note: In section 44 (7) of the Regulations exempt dealings for the following RF emitting devices:

  • radar equipment used for detection and ranging
  • radiofrequency equipment used for communications
  • Klystron

3. Criteria to be satisfied

Section 9 of the Regulations consists of two separate criteria, both of which must be fulfilled for the apparatus to be classed as controlled apparatus. 

The first criterion paragraph 9(1)(b) concerns source emission. It is fulfilled if the apparatus produces non-ionising radiation that could lead to a person being exposed to radiation levels exceeding the non-ionizing radiation exposure limits. For RF the relevant standard referred to in section 4 is Radiation Protection Standard for Limiting Exposure to Radiofrequency Fields – 100 kHz to 300 GHz (RPS S-1). This document specifies reference levels which have been derived from the basic restriction levels. The reference levels have been chosen as they are based on quantities that are easy to measure and compliance with the reference levels will ensure compliance with the basic restrictions. See Appendix 2 for more details and extracts from RPS S-1.  

Some of the apparatus (for example induction heaters) also generate electric and magnetic fields at 50/60 Hz. In this case the exposure limits referred to in section 4 are in the ICNIRP Guidelines for Limiting Exposure to Time-Varying Electric and Magnetic Fields (1 Hz – 100 kHz). See Appendix 3 for more details and extracts from the ICNIRP Guidelines.  

The second criterion, paragraph 9(1)(c) is based on the accessibility of the source. Factors determining whether radiation above the exposure limits is accessible to persons have to be evaluated. The condition is fulfilled if excess levels of radiation are readily accessible to persons in any of the following situations: 

  • in the course of intended operations or procedures of the apparatus; or
  • as a result of a reasonably foreseeable abnormal event involving the apparatus; or 
  • as a result of a reasonably foreseeable single element failure of the apparatus; or
  • without the use of tools or other specialised equipment required to remove protective barriers or access panels.

The following procedure describes how to go through these two criteria to determine whether an RF emitting device is classed as controlled or not.

4. Radiofrequency (high frequency) and low frequency radiation

The part of the electromagnetic spectrum with high frequencies is in the range 3 kHz to 300 GHz and is referred to as radiofrequency (RF). The low frequency is in the range of 1 Hz to 100 kHz which include the 50/60 Hz electric and magnetic fields. The diagram below shows the divisions of the electromagnetic spectrum that are commonly accepted and will be used in this guide. Microwave (MW) frequency radiation is commonly used to denote a subset of RF radiation, typically at frequencies from 300 MHz to 300 GHz. 

RF and MW radiation are forms of non-ionising radiation where individual photons are not energetic enough to break chemical bonds or remove electrons (ionisation). Ultraviolet, visible and infrared light are other forms of non-ionising radiation.

 

Diagram showing Electromagnetic spectrum with frequencies of some RF applications

Figure 1:  Electromagnetic spectrum with frequencies of some RF applications shown

Reference Documents

  • Radiation Protection Standard for Limiting Exposure to Radiofrequency Fields – 100 kHz to 300 GHz (2021), ARPANSA Radiation Protection Series S-1 (RPS S-1). 

    The ARPANSA RF Standard sets limits for human exposure to RF EMR in the frequency range 100 kHz to 300 GHz. The Standard also includes requirements for management of risk in occupational exposure and measures for protection of the general public together with additional information on measurement and assessment of compliance. Extracts from this document can be found in Appendix 2.
     
  • ICNIRP Guidelines for Limiting Exposure to Time-Varying Electric and Magnetic Fields 1Hz-100 kHz (2010), Health Physics 99(6):818-836

    The International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) guidelines are aimed at preventing the established health effects resulting from exposure to ELF EMF. The ICNIRP ELF guidelines are consistent with ARPANSA’s understanding of the scientific basis for the protection of the general public and workers from exposure to ELF EMF. Extracts from this document can be found in Appendix 3.

Definitions 

Exposure limits – Elimit: are defined in terms of basic restrictions for occupational and general public exposure as specified in RPS S-1 and the ICNIRP Guidelines. Different exposure limits apply for occupational exposure and exposure to the general public.

Controlled apparatus (non-ionising) as defined in the Act: an apparatus prescribed by the regulations that produces harmful non-ionising radiation when energised.

Procedure for determining controlled apparatus

This procedure (as illustrated by the flow chart below) will assist you to determine whether your apparatus is controlled or not.  

This procedure (as shown in the flow chart below) will assist you to determine whether your apparatus is controlled or not.  

1. A prescribed apparatus that produces non-ionizing radiation that could lead to a person being exposed to radiation levels exceeding the non-ionizing radiation exposure limits. For example, if the apparatus is one of the devices stated in Section 1 Controlled apparatus. 

2. If there is a reasonably foreseeable abnormal event that could lead to a person being exposed to radiation levels in excess of the maximum exposure level, as specified in RPS S-1 or the ICNIRP Guidelines and reproduced in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3, the apparatus is classed as controlled apparatus. Examples of reasonably foreseeable abnormal events are possible exposure during normal maintenance, easy overriding of an interlock, entry into exclusion zones etc.   

3. If there is a reasonably foreseeable single element failure of the apparatus that would lead to a person being exposed to levels above the maximum exposure level, then the apparatus is classed as controlled apparatus. An example of this is a malfunctioning interlock. 

4. If the apparatus is enclosed the possibility of removal of the access panels or protective barriers has to be assessed. If there is no enclosure, choose no, and go to the next step. If a person can be exposed to levels above the maximum exposure level when removing protective barriers or access panels that do not require the use of tools or other specialized equipment, the apparatus is classed as controlled apparatus. 

5. Estimate the exposure level that a person could receive in the course of intended operations and procedures, ELop. The distance to the unit during intended operations should be estimated and the expected exposure level calculated or measured. The attenuation provided by any fixed shields should be taken into account. 

Compare with the exposure limits (Elimit) as specified in RPS S-1 or ICNIRP Guidelines.  

If     ELop > Elimit    then the apparatus is classed as controlled apparatus

If     ELop < Elimit     then the apparatus is not classed as controlled apparatus

 

RF source workflow

Appendix 1: Examples of RF emitting apparatus 

1. Induction heater 

Definition: A heater that uses an induced electric current to produce heat.

Description: In an induction heater a conducting material is heated by induction of an electric current in the object to be heated. The resistance of the metal leads to heating. An induction heater consists of an electromagnet through which a high-frequency alternating current is passed. Heat can also be generated by magnetic hysteresis losses.  

Induction heating provides a controllable and localized method of heating without contact between the heater and the components. Typical uses for induction heaters are heat treatment of metals, hardening of steel, annealing, bonding, curing and forging. A typical induction heater is shown below in Figure 2 and induction heating of a metal bar is shown in Figure 3.

 

Induction heater

Figure 2: Induction heater

 

Induction heating of a metal bar

Figure 3: Induction heating of a metal bar

[Source: Remarkable Machines Affordable Price | Superior Induction Company]

Operating frequencies range from 50/60 Hz to over 1 MHz. Induction welders and induction solders are types of induction heaters and are included in the above category. 

2. Induction furnace

Definition: A furnace that uses an induced electric current to heat a metal to its melting point.

Description: An induction furnace uses induction to heat a metal to its melting point. The heating mechanism is the same as in the induction heater. Common metals that are melted are iron, steel, copper, aluminium and precious metals. Melting and mixing rates can be controlled by selecting and varying the frequency and power. A picture of an induction furnace is shown in Figure 4. 

 

Induction furnace

Figure 4: Induction furnace

[Source: Induction Furnace by Amritsar Machine Tools from Faridabad Haryana | ID - 106212 (exportersindia.com)]

3. Industrial radiofrequency heater 

Definition: A heating device in which heat is generated through a radiofrequency field. Industrial signifies that the apparatus is not used for domestic applications. 

Description: The frequency of operation of RF heaters is in the range 10 MHz – 100 MHz, with output powers up to 100 kW. Common frequencies are 13.56 MHz, 27.12 MHz and 40.68 MHz. These frequencies have been designated to prevent interference with communications equipment.

RF heaters are used to heat, melt, dry or cure dielectric materials (insulators or poor conductors that can be polarized by an applied electric field). Plastic, glue and rubber are electrical and thermal insulators and consequently difficult to heat using conventional methods. These materials are well suited for heating with an RF heater. This is in contrast to induction heaters (defined in the previous section) which operate at lower frequencies and are used to heat materials which are good conductors of electricity. RF heaters can be used in industrial drying processes and are then often called RF dryers.

4. Industrial radiofrequency welder 

Definition: A heating device in which heat is generated through a radiofrequency field and the heat is used to weld the material. Industrial signifies that the apparatus is not used for domestic applications. 

Description: The heating mechanism is the same in an RF welder as in an RF heater. The material (often plastic) is heated to its melting point and the work pieces are joined together. RF welders are sometimes called RF sealers. An example of a RF welder is shown in Figure 5. 

 

Industrial RF welder 

Figure 5: Industrial RF welder 

[Source: RF Sealers with Bar Welders | Custom Automation | Cosmos and Kabar (cosmos-kabar.com)]

5. Radiofrequency plasma tube

Definition: A tube containing plasma which is created by a radiofrequency field.  

Description: An RF generator is attached to the RF tube and is used to generate the plasma. The tube typically contains a gas or a mixture of gases. As the gas is ionized, free electrons are accelerated in the field and collide with the atoms thereby exciting the atoms. As the atoms are de-excited photons are emitted resulting in visible or ultraviolet emission. A picture of an RF plasma tube is shown in Figure 6. Common frequencies are 13.56 MHz and 2.45 GHz.

 

A radiofrequency plasma tube 

Figure 6: A radiofrequency plasma tube 

[Source: Gas Plasma Tube For High Power RF (plasmasonics.com)]

6. Microwave or Radiofrequency (RF) diathermy equipment

Definition: Microwave diathermy equipment uses electromagnetic energy in the microwave frequency range (300 MHz to 300 GHz) for therapeutic purposes.

Whilst, RF diathermy equipment uses electromagnetic energy in the frequency range (3-30 MHz) for therapeutic purposes.

In Australia the only approved frequency for microwave diathermy treatment is 2450 MHz.  

RF diathermy is sometimes referred to as shortwave diathermy. In Australia the only approved frequency for RF diathermy is 27.12 MHz. A picture of a diathermy unit is shown in Figure 7.

 

Diathermy unit

Figure 7: Diathermy unit

[Source: China Microwave Diathermy, Microwave Diathermy Wholesale, Manufacturers, Price | Made-in-China.com]

Note: Microwave and RF diathermy are not used very much nowadays and very few licence holders have this apparatus. In both microwave diathermy and RF diathermy heating of muscular tissue is performed for therapeutic reasons. In surgical diathermy a high-frequency electric current is made to pass through the body between two contact electrodes. The frequency is lower than for RF diathermy, typically 0.5–3 MHz. Surgical diathermy is not included in the above definition for microwave and radiofrequency diathermy equipment.

7. Industrial microwave processing system

Definition: A system where energy in the form of microwaves is used for heating or drying. Industrial signifies that the apparatus is not used for domestic applications.  

Common microwave frequencies are 915 MHz, 2.45 GHz and 5.8 GHz. An industrial microwave is considered an industrial microwave processing system.

 

Industrial microwave processing system

Figure 8: Industrial microwave processing system

[Source: Continuous Microwave Ovens | Cellencor]

8. Industrial radiofrequency processing system

Definition: A system where energy in the form of radiofrequency waves is used for heating or drying. Industrial signifies that the apparatus is not used for domestic applications.  

The most common RF frequencies are 13.56 MHz, 27.12 MHz and 40.68 MHz. Note that the definition for an industrial RF processing system is similar to the definition for an industrial RF heater. Typically an industrial RF processing system is a large enclosed unit used for large scale heating or drying (see Figure 9).

Radiofrequency and microwave processing systems are frequently used for heating and drying of materials such as paper, ceramics, food and plastics. Heating through RF and microwave is fast compared with conventional heating mechanisms which makes them a preferred option for pasteurization and sterilization. Microwave heating is a common choice in a laboratory environment. The heating mechanism is the same in RF heating, the only difference being the lower frequency. The selection of RF or microwave heating depends on the physical properties of the process. The penetration depth is greater for RF (longer wavelength) which can therefore be more suited for larger scale systems. RF systems also have a greater uniformity of heating.

 

Industrial RF processing system used for drying food

Figure 9: Industrial RF processing system used for drying products

[Source: General Industry - Radio Frequency Co. - Industrial]

Appendix 2: Extracts from RPS S-1 Limiting Exposure to RF Fields – 100 kHz to 300 GHz (2021)

General information

The standard includes:

  • mandatory basic restrictions for both occupational and general public exposure involving the whole body and also for exposure over localised areas of the body
  • indicative reference levels for measurable quantities derived from the basic restrictions
  • approaches for verification of compliance with the standard
  • requirements for management of risk in occupational exposure and measures for protection of the general public 

Basic Restrictions:

Mandatory limits on exposure to RF fields are based on established health effects and are termed ‘basic restrictions’. Depending on the frequency the physical quantities used to specify the basic restrictions are induced electric field (Eind), specific absorption rate (SAR), specific energy absorption (SA) and absorbed energy density (Uab). These quantities are often impractical to measure. Therefore reference levels are measured as an alternative means of showing compliance with the mandatory basic restrictions.

Reference Levels:

Reference levels using quantities that are more practical to measure have been developed. The reference levels have been conservatively formulated such that compliance with the reference levels will ensure compliance with the basic restrictions. Provided that all basic restrictions are met and adverse effects can be excluded, the reference levels may be exceeded. Hence the reference levels have been conservatively formulated such that compliance with the reference levels will ensure compliance with the basic restrictions. The relevant reference level quantities are incident electric field strength (Einc), incident magnetic field strength (Hinc), incident power density (Sinc), plane-wave equivalent incident power density (Seq), incident energy density (Uinc), and plane-wave equivalent incident energy density (Ueq), all measured outside the body, and electric current (I) inside the body.

Reference levels are given for occupational exposure and exposure to the general public. These groups are distinguished by their potential level of exposure. 

In the extract from RPS S-1 below, reference levels are specified in Tables 4 - 7 and have been set to protect against effects associated with:

  • Table 4 whole body exposure (averaged over 30 minutes) 
  • Table 5 local exposure (averaged over 6 minutes)
  • Table 6 brief local exposure (integrated over intervals between >0 and <6 minutes)
  • Table 7 instantaneous local exposure (peak instantaneous field strength) 

For further information see Radiation Protection Series S-1.

Table 4: Reference levels for whole body exposure averaged over 30 minutes to RF electromagnetic fields from 100 kHz to 300 GHz (unperturbed rms fields)

Exposure Scenario Frequency range Incident E-field strength Einc
(V/m)
Incident H-field strength Hinc
(A/m)
Incident power density Sinc
(W/m2)
Occupational 0.1-6.943MHz ES 4.9/fM NA
>6.943-30 MHz 660/fM0.7 4.9/fM NA
>30-400 MHz 61 0.16 10
400–2000MHz 3fM 0.5 0.008fM 0.5 fM /40
2–300 GHz NA NA 50
General Public 0.1-6.27MHz ES 2.2/fM NA
6.27-30 MHz 300/fM 0.7 2.2/fM NA
>30-400 MHz 27.7 0.073 2
>400-2000 MHz 1.375fM 0.5 0.0037fM 0.5 fM/200
>2–300 GHz NA NA 10

Notes:

  1. ‘NA’ signifies ‘not applicable’ and does not need to be taken into account when determining compliance. 
  2. ‘ES’ signifies that no reference level is available, as it would be greater than the reference level for spatial peak and temporal peak field strengths based on electrostimulation effects shown in Table 7. 
  3. fM is frequency in MHz. 
  4. Sinc, Einc and Hinc are to be averaged over 30 minutes, over the whole-body space. Temporal and spatial averaging of each of Einc and Hinc must be conducted by averaging over the relevant square values (see ICNIRP guidelines for limiting exposure to electromagnetic fields (100 kHz to 300 GHz), Health Physics, 118(5):483–524 for details) see International best practice - non-ionising radiation safety | ARPANSA.
  5. For frequencies of 100 kHz to 30 MHz, regardless of the far-field/near-field zone distinctions, compliance is demonstrated if neither Einc nor Hinc exceeds the above reference level values. 
  6. For frequencies of >30 MHz to 2 GHz: a) within the far-field and radiating near field zones: compliance is demonstrated if either Sinc, Einc or Hinc, does not exceed the above reference level values (only one is required); Seq derived from either Einc or Hinc may be substituted for Sinc; b) within the reactive near-field zone: compliance is demonstrated if both Einc and Hinc do not exceed the above reference level values; Sinc cannot be used to demonstrate compliance, and so basic restrictions must be assessed. 
  7. For frequencies of >2 GHz to 300 GHz: a) within the far-field and radiating near field zones: compliance is demonstrated if Sinc does not exceed the above reference level values; Seq derived from either Einc or Hinc may be substituted for Sinc; b) within the reactive near-field zone, reference levels cannot be used to determine compliance, and so basic restrictions must be assessed. 

Table 5: Reference levels for local exposure averaged over 6 minutes, to electromagnetic fields from 100 kHz to 300 GHz (unperturbed rms fields)

Exposure Scenario Frequency range Incident E-field strength Einc
(V/m)
Incident H-field strength Hinc
(A/m)
Incident power density Sinc
(W/m2)
Occupational 0.1-0.135 MHz ES ES NA
>0.135-10 MHz ES 10.8/fM NA
>10-30 MHz 1504/fM0.7 10.8/fM NA
>30-400 MHz 139 0.36 50
>400-2000 MHz 10.58fM0.43 0.0274fM0.43 0.29fM0.86
>2-6 GHz NA NA 200
>6-<300 GHz NA NA 275/fG0.177
300 GHz NA NA 100
General Public 0.1-0.233 MHz ES ES NA
>0.233-10 MHz ES 4.9/fM NA
>10-30 MHz 671/fM 0.7 4.9/fM NA
>30-400 MHz 62 0.163 10
>400-2000 MHz 4.72fM 0.43 0.0123fM 0.43 0.058fM 0.86
>2-6 GHz NA NA 40
>6-<300 GHz NA NA 55/fG 0.177
300 GHz NA NA 20

Notes:

  1. ‘NA’ signifies ‘not applicable’ and does not need to be taken into account when determining compliance. 
  2. ‘ES’ signifies that no reference level is available, as it would be greater than the reference level for spatial peak and temporal peak field strengths based on electrostimulation effects shown in Table 7. 
  3. fM is frequency in MHz; fG is frequency in GHz. 
  4. Sinc, Einc and Hinc are to be averaged over 6 minutes, and where spatial averaging is specified in Notes 6-7, over the relevant projected body space. Temporal and spatial averaging of each of Einc and Hinc must be conducted by averaging over the relevant square values (see ICNIRP guidelines for limiting exposure to electromagnetic fields (100 kHz to 300 GHz), Health Physics, 118(5):483–524 for details) see link International best practice - non-ionising radiation safety | ARPANSA to the ICNIRP website.
  5. For frequencies of 100 kHz to 30 MHz, regardless of the far-field/near-field zone distinctions, compliance is demonstrated if neither peak spatial Einc nor peak spatial Hinc, over the projected whole-body space, exceeds the above reference level values. 
  6. For frequencies of >30 MHz to 6 GHz: a) within the far-field and radiating near field zones, compliance is demonstrated if one of peak spatial Sinc, Einc or Hinc, over the projected whole-body space, does not exceed the above reference level values (only one is required); Seq derived from either Einc or Hinc may be substituted for Sinc; b) within the reactive near-field zone: compliance is demonstrated if both Einc and Hinc do not exceed the above reference level values; Sinc cannot be used to demonstrate compliance; for frequencies >2 GHz, reference levels cannot be used to determine compliance, and so basic restrictions must be assessed.
  7. For frequencies of >6 GHz to 300 GHz: a) within the far-field and radiating near field zones, compliance is demonstrated if Sinc, averaged over a square 4 cm2 projected body surface space, does not exceed the above reference level values; Seq derived from either Einc or Hinc may be substituted for Sinc; b) within the reactive near-field zone, reference levels cannot be used to determine compliance, and so basic restrictions must be assessed. 
  8. For frequencies of >30 GHz to 300 GHz, exposure averaged over a square 1-cm2 projected body surface space must not exceed twice that of the square 4 cm2 Sinc restrictions.

Table 6: Reference levels for local exposure, integrated over intervals of between >0 and <6 minutes to RF electromagnetic fields from 100 kHz to 300 GHz (unperturbed rms fields)

Exposure Scenario Frequency range Incident energy density Uinc
(kJ/m2)
Occupational 100 kHz – 400 MHz NA
>400 – 2000 MHz 0.29fM0.86 x 0.36(0.05+0.95[t/360]0.5)
>2 – 6 GHz 200 x 0.36(0.05+0.95[t/360]0.5)
>6 – <300 GHz 275/fG0.177 x 0.36(0.05+0.95[t/360]0.5)
300 GHz 100 x 0.36(0.05+0.95[t/360]0.5)
General Public 100 kHz – 400 MHz NA
>400 – 2000 MHz 0.058fM0.86 x 0.36(0.05+0.95[t/360]0.5)
>2 – 6 GHz 40 x 0.36(0.05+0.95[t/360]0.5)
>6 – <300 GHz 55/fG0.177 x 0.36(0.05+0.95[t/360]0.5)
300 GHz 20 x 0.36(0.05+0.95[t/360]0.5)

Notes:

  1. ‘NA’ signifies ‘not applicable’ and does not need to be taken into account when determining compliance. 
  2. fM is frequency in MHz; fG is frequency in GHz; t is the exposure time interval in seconds, such that exposure from any pulse, group of pulses, or subgroup of pulses in a train, as well as from the summation of exposures (including non-pulsed RF electromagnetic fields), delivered in t seconds, must not exceed these reference level values for any time 0 < t < 360 s. 
  3. Uinc is to be calculated over time t, and where spatial averaging is specified in Notes 5-7, over the relevant projected body space. 
  4. For frequencies of 100 kHz to 400 MHz, >0 to <6-minute restrictions are not required and so reference levels have not been set. 
  5. For frequencies of >400 MHz to 6 GHz: a) within the far-field and radiating near field zones: compliance is demonstrated if peak spatial Uinc, over the projected whole-body space, does not exceed the above reference level values; Ueq derived from either Einc or Hinc may be substituted for Uinc; b) within the reactive near-field zone, reference levels cannot be used to determine compliance, and so basic restrictions must be assessed. 
  6. For frequencies of >6 GHz to 300 GHz: a) within the far-field or radiative near-field zone, compliance is demonstrated if Uinc, averaged over a square 4 cm2 projected body surface space, does not exceed the above reference level values; Ueq derived from either Einc or Hinc may be substituted for Uinc; b) within the reactive near-field zone, reference levels cannot be used to determine compliance, and so basic restrictions must be assessed. 
  7. For frequencies of >30 GHz to 300 GHz: exposure averaged over a square 1cm2 projected body surface space must not exceed 275/fG0.177 x 0.72(0.025+0.975[t/360]0.5) kJ/m2 for occupational and 55/fG0.177 x 0.72(0.025+0.975[t/360]0.5) kJ/m2 for general public exposure.

Table 7: Reference levels for spatial peak and temporal peak field strength to RF electromagnetic fields from 100 kHz to 300 GHz (unperturbed rms fields)

Exposure Scenario Frequency range Incident E-field strength Einc
(V/m)
Incident H-field strength Hinc
(A/m)
Occupational 100 kHz – 10 MHz 170 80
General Public 100 kHz – 10 MHz 83 21

Notes: 

  1. Regardless of the far-field/near-field zone distinction, compliance is demonstrated if neither the temporal nor spatial peak Einc or Hinc, over the space occupied by the body, exceeds the above reference level values. 

The figures for occupational and general public reference levels for whole body and local exposure to RF electromagnetic fields as specified in tables 4 and 5 can be found in RPS S-1 Schedule 1.

Reference levels for limb currents

Limb current reference levels have been set to account for effects of grounding near human body resonance frequencies that might otherwise lead to reference levels underestimating exposures within tissue at certain RF electromagnetic field frequencies (averaged over 6 minutes – see Table 8) Limb current reference levels are only relevant in exposure scenarios where a person is not electrically isolated from a ground plane.

Table 8: Reference levels for current induced in any limb averaged over 6 minutes at frequencies between 100 kHz and 110 MHz

Exposure Scenario Frequency range Current I (mA)
Occupational 10 MHz – 110 MHz 100
General Public 10 MHz – 110 MHz 45

Notes: 

  1. Current intensity values must be determined by averaging over the relevant square values (see ICNIRP guidelines for limiting exposure to electromagnetic fields (100 kHz to 300 GHz), Health Physics, 118(5):483–524 for details), the document can be downloaded from the ARPANSA website link International best practice - non-ionising radiation safety | ARPANSA to the ICNIRP website.
  2. Limb current intensity must be evaluated separately for each limb. 
  3. Limb current reference levels are not provided for any other frequency range. 
  4. Limb current reference levels are only required for cases where the human body is not electrically isolated from a ground plane. 

Tables 4 to 8 specify averaging and integrating times of the relevant exposure quantities to determine whether personal exposure level is compliant with the Standard. These averaging and integrating times are continuous periods.

Guidance for contact currents

Exposure due to contact currents is indirect, in that it requires an intermediate conducting object to transduce the field. This makes contact current exposure unpredictable, due to both behavioural factors (e.g., grasping versus touch contact) and environmental conditions (e.g., configuration of conductive objects), and reduces this Standard’s ability to protect against them. Accordingly, the ICNIRP guidelines and the Standard do not provide restrictions for contact currents, and instead provide ‘guidance’ to assist those responsible for transmitting high-power RF fields to understand contact currents, the potential hazards, and how to mitigate such hazards. 

In determining the likelihood and nature of the hazard due to potential contact current scenarios, ICNIRP views the following as important for the Responsible Person in managing risk associated with contact currents within the 100 kHz to 110 MHz region. 

(a) Contact current thresholds for reversible, mild pain, for adults and children, are likely to be approximately 20 mA and 10 mA respectively. 

(b) Contact current magnitude will increase as a function of field strength and is affected by conducting-object configuration such as the proximity to the original source and the angular alignment to the original source. 

(c) Risk of contact current hazards can be minimized by training workers to avoid contact with conducting objects, but where contact is required, the following factors are important: 

i.    Large conducting objects should be connected to ground (grounding). 

ii.    Workers should make contact via insulating materials or PPE (e.g., RF protective gloves). 

iii.    Reducing or removing the RF power at the original source can eliminate the risk. 

iv.    Workers should be made aware of the risks, including the possibility of ‘surprise’, which may impact on safety in ways other than the direct impact of the current on tissue (for example, by causing accidents when working at heights).

Appendix 3: Extracts from the ICNIRP Guidelines for Limiting Exposure to Time-Varying Electric and Magnetic Fields 1Hz-100 kHz (2010)

General information

This publication establishes guidelines for limiting exposure to electric and magnetic fields in the low frequency range of the electromagnetic spectrum. Separate guidance is given for occupational and general public exposures.

Reference Levels

A summary of the reference levels recommended for occupational and general public exposures to electric and a magnetic field is given in Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3: Reference levels for occupational exposure to time-varying electric and magnetic fields (unperturbed rms fields)

Frequency range E-field strength
E (kV/m-1)
Magnetic-field strength
H (A m-1)
Magnetic flux density
B (T)
1 Hz-8 Hz 20 1.63x105/f2 0.2/f2
8 Hz-25 Hz 20 2x104/f 2.5x10-2/f
25 Hz-300 Hz 5x102/f 8x102 1x10-3
300 Hz-3 kHz 5x102/f 2.4x105/f 0.3/f
3 kHz-10 MHz 1.7x10-1 80 1x10-4

Notes:

  • f in Hz
  • Refer ICNIRP Guidelines separate sections for advice on non-sinusoidal and multiple frequency exposure
  • To prevent indirect effects especially in high electric fields, see section on “Protective measures” in the ICNIRP Guidelines
  • In the frequency range above 100 kHz, RF specific reference levels need to be considered additionally.

Table 4: Reference levels for general public exposure to time-varying electric and magnetic fields (unperturbed rms values)

Frequency range E-field strength
E (kV/m-1)
Magnetic-field strength
H (A m-1)
Magnetic flux density
B (T)
1 Hz-8 Hz 5 3.2x104/f2 4x10-2/f2
8 Hz-25 Hz 5 4x103/f 5x10-3/f
25 Hz-50 Hz 5 1.6x102 2x10-4
50 Hz-400 Hz 2.5x102/f 1.6x102 2x10-4
400 Hz-3 kHz 2.5x102/f 6.4x104/f 8x10-2/f
3 kHz-10 MHz 8.3x10-2 21 2.7x10-5

Notes:

  • f in Hz
  • Refer ICNIRP Guidelines separate sections for advice on non-sinusoidal and multiple frequency exposure
  • In the frequency range above 100 kHz, RF specific reference levels need to be considered additionally

For further information on the ICNIRP Guidelines for Limiting Exposure to Time-Varying Electric and Magnetic Fields 1Hz-100 kHz see International best practice - non-ionising radiation safety | ARPANSA.

Regulatory Guide - UV emitting apparatus case studies (ARPANSA-GDE-1748)

Introduction

This document is provided to assist applicants and licence holders assess UV emitting apparatus. It may also be useful for non-licence holders to gain an understanding of the hazard of some typical UV emitting apparatus. It contains case studies of apparatus that have been assessed by ARPANSA. 

Read this guide in conjunction with Regulatory Guide: Determining whether a UV source is a controlled apparatus.

If you have any questions on how to evaluate your specific apparatus please contact your regulatory officer or send an email to: licenceadmin@arpansa.gov.au.

Note: Subsection 44(7) of the Regulations exempts dealings with the following UV emitting apparatus:

  • an artificial optical source emitting ultraviolet A radiation (315 – 400 nm)
  • a completely enclosed apparatus containing an ultraviolet radiation light source (e.g., a spectrophotometer)
  • a biological safety cabinet (laminar flow or biohazard) with a failsafe interlocking system
     

Contents

Apparatus Outcome
1. Biological safety cabinet – Example 1 Controlled apparatus
2. Biological safety cabinet – Example 2 Not controlled apparatus
3. High-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) Not controlled apparatus
4. Pen-ray Mercury lamp Controlled apparatus
5. Spectrophotometer Not controlled apparatus
6. Transilluminator Controlled apparatus
7. UV light box Controlled apparatus
8. Water steriliser – Example 1 Controlled apparatus
9. Water steriliser – Example 2 Not controlled apparatus

1. Biological safety cabinet – Example 1

 

biological safety cabinet

Details of the apparatus 

  • The biological safety cabinet emits at a wavelength of 254 nm, which is in the UVC region (180 – 280 nm). It is a germicidal lamp which means that the emission levels will be well above the exposure limits. 
  • The lower access panel can be taken off while the UV lamp is energized.
  • There is no interlock or the interlock can be overridden.

Assessment

During intended operations or procedures the exposure limits will not be exceeded, as the window and access panel will protect the user. The UV light is only used between procedures for disinfecting. It should not be used while samples are being handled.  

It is reasonably foreseeable that a person could remove the access panel while the UV light is on and receive an exposure. 

This biological safety cabinet is classed as controlled apparatus

2. Biological safety cabinet – Example 2

 

biological safety cabinet

Details of the apparatus 

  • The biological safety cabinet emits UV light at 254 nm (UVC). It is a germicidal lamp which means that the emission levels will be well above the exposure limits.
  • The fluorescent lamps and UV light cannot work simultaneously as they are electronically interlocked.
  • While the unit is in UV mode the sliding window cannot be opened.
  • UV light cannot be turned on while the sliding door is open. 
  • If a fault occurred and the window could be opened electronically or manually, an interlock will cut the UV emission. The interlock is failsafe (meaning that if it should fail the UV emission will terminate) and hard to override.

Assessment

During intended operations or procedures the exposure limits will not be exceeded. 

Due to the robust failsafe, interlock there is no reasonably foreseeable abnormal event that would expose a person to levels above the exposure limits. 

As the interlock is failsafe there is no reasonably foreseeable single element failure that would expose a person to levels above the exposure limits. 

This biological safety cabinet is not classed as controlled apparatus 

Comment 

This assessment is based on the above criteria for a biological safety cabinet. Most standard older biological safety (laminar flow/biohazard) cabinets containing a UV source are classed as controlled apparatus. Please contact an ARPANSA regulatory officer to discuss if you have a biological safety cabinet that you believe is not classed as controlled apparatus on the same grounds as in the example above.

3. High-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC)

 

high-performance liquid chromatography

Details of the apparatus 

  • The UV light source is completely enclosed
  • Low UV emission

Assessment

During intended operations or procedures the exposure limits will not be exceeded. 

It is not reasonably foreseeable that a person could access the UV source and receive exposures above the exposure limit. 

A person cannot remove access panels without use of tools or specialised equipment. 

The apparatus is not classed as controlled apparatus

Comment

If a unit is a standard HPLC with properties similar to the one above it is automatically classed as not controlled. There is no need to assess it against the regulatory guide.

4. Pen-Ray Mercury lamp

 

pen ray mercury lamp

Source: http://uvp.com/mercury.html

Details of the apparatus

  • UV lamp used in a number of applications in laboratories (sterilisation, fluorescent inspection, wavelength calibration etc.)  
  • Lamp emits Mercury spectral lines with the primary emission at 254nm.
  • Typical intensity:
    • 254 nm @ 20 mm distance = 4700 µW/cm2 = 47 W/m2 (UVC)
    • 365 nm @ 20 mm distance = 215 µW/cm2 = 2.15 W/m2 (UVA)

Assessment

Skin and Eye UVR exposure:

Calculate the effective irradiance according to RPS 12:

At 20 mm:

 

Equation

 

Equation

       
At 20 cm: 

 

Equation

It is reasonably foreseeable that someone would be exposed for more than 2 minutes at 20 cm distance or more than 1.3 seconds at 20 mm distance. This means that the UVR exposure limit could be exceeded.

Eye UVA (315 – 400 nm) exposure:

At 20 mm: E365nm=  2.15 W/m2

 

Equation

 

At 50 cm:  

 

Equation

 

 

Equation

The exposure limit at 50 cm  

 

Equation

Maximum UVA exposure for the eyes will not be exceeded. The exposure to the skin will be the limiting factor.  

It is reasonably foreseeable that a person could be exposed to levels above the exposure limit.

The apparatus is classed as controlled apparatus

5. Spectrophotometer

 

spectrophotometer

Details of the apparatus 

  • The UV light source is enclosed during operation
  • Low UV emission

Assessment

During intended operations or procedures the exposure limits will not be exceeded. 

It is not reasonably foreseeable that a person could access the UV source and receive exposures above the exposure limit. 

The apparatus is not classed as controlled apparatus

Comment

If a unit is a standard spectrophotometer with properties similar to the one above it is automatically classed as not controlled. There is no need to assess it against the regulatory guide.

6. Transilluminator

 

transilluminator

 

transilluminator

Details of the apparatus 

  • The emission of transilluminators is typically 254 nm, 312 nm or 366 nm.
  • Transilluminators are powerful sources of UV radiation. Emission levels are above exposure limits. Transilluminators, used in research can be a significant source of occupational exposure to UVR. Hands, arms, face and eyes are likely sites of injury. Working unprotected for even a few minutes can cause injury.

Assessment

Reasonably foreseeable abnormal events where exposure limits could be exceeded are:

  • shielding is removed or non-existent
  • PPE is not worn or is not appropriate

Both transilluminators are classed as controlled apparatus

Comment 

There have been a number of incidents where the user of a transilluminator developed erythema because appropriate PPE was not used and a shield was not present.   

7. UV light box

 

uv light box

 

uv light box

Details of the apparatus 

  • Homemade units 
  • Manual switches turns UV source on and off
  • Intensity levels unknown
  • There is no interlock or fixed shielding

Assessment

It is reasonably foreseeable that someone might place their hand in the box while the UV source in on. If the levels are high enough the exposure levels could be exceeded. 

The apparatus is classed as controlled apparatus 

Comment 

If emission levels are measured and found to be low (no reasonably foreseeable abnormal event where a person would be exposed to levels above the exposure limit) the apparatus is not controlled.

8. Water steriliser – Example 1

 

water steriliser

Details of the apparatus 

  • Water steriliser where UV lamp is used to kill bacteria as the water flows past. 
  • Germicidal action which means that emission levels are high (primarily UVC – 254 nm). 
  • UV light is leaking out from the back of the unit. The unit is completely enclosed apart from this opening. The emission levels of the escaping UV light have not been quantified. 
  • The enclosure is interlocked. 

Assessment

We can assume that the intensity of the escaping light is low so that during intended operations or procedures the exposure limits will not be exceeded (a person will not normally be close to the unit). 
It is reasonably foreseeable that a person could hold their hand close to the unit and be exposed to the escaping light. As we do not know the intensity of the escaping light we make the conservative assumption that the exposure limit can be exceeded. 

The apparatus is classed as controlled apparatus

9. Water steriliser – Example 2

 

water steriliser

Details of the apparatus 

  • Water steriliser where UV lamp is used to kill bacteria as the water flows past. 
  • The emission of the UV light is at 254 nm (UVC). Germicidal action which means that emission levels are high. 
  • The unit is fully enclosed and the housing is not interlocked.  
  • A screwdriver is needed to open the housing. 

Assessment

During intended operations or procedures the exposure limits will not be exceeded as the source is completely enclosed.

A reasonably foreseeable abnormal event that would expose a person to levels above the exposure limit could be exposure during maintenance when the UV lamp is replaced. The standard operating procedure for changing the lamp illustrates that the lamp is completely enclosed in a special housing, and that the power has to be switched off before you can access the UV lamp. From this it is concluded that there is no risk of exposure during the process of changing the lamp. 

Excess levels of radiation are not accessible under a reasonable foreseeable single element failure of the apparatus and the source cannot be accessed without the use of tools or specialised equipment. 

The apparatus is not classed as controlled apparatus

Regulatory Guide - Applying for a source licence (or amendment) (ARPANSA-GDE-1740)

Associated forms

Selecting the correct application form

There are 3 source licence application forms - the choice of form depends on the hazard of the source(s): Group 1 sources are considered low hazard, Group 2 sources are considered medium hazard and Group 3 sources are considered high hazard. Section 4 of the Regulations describes the types of sources in each group and this will assist you to select the correct application form.  

Completing the application form

Section A: Applicant Information

Department or Commonwealth entity

This is the name of the Department or entity on behalf of which the application is being made. It may include further information for ease of identification e.g. Division, Branch, Section etc.

Portfolio

Name of the Commonwealth ministerial portfolio in which the Department or entity resides. 

Applicant/Responsible Person

The application must be made by the chief executive of the Department or entity or by a person authorised by the chief executive.

The applicant must provide their full name, position and business address. If it is made by an authorised person, the application must include a copy of the authorisation.

Note 1: Responsible person in relation to any radiation source, prescribed radiation facility or premises on which radiation sources are stored or used means the legal person: (a) having overall management responsibility including responsibility for the security and maintenance of the radiation source, facility or premises (b) having overall control over who may use the radiation source, facility or premises (c) in whose name the radiation source, facility or premises would be registered if this is required. RPS C-1 Code for Radiation Protection in Planned Exposure Situations

Nominee

If the applicant is physically removed from the source dealing such that they cannot demonstrate effective control, the name and contact details of a person more directly in control of the source dealing must be provided. This nominee must be in effective control of the sources. Generally the nominee will be the manager of a division or agency’s operation at the site of the proposed activity or, in the case of mobile devices, where the devices are usually stored. Other nominees may also be acceptable where the hazards of the activity are low and only minimal control is required. If a nominee is appointed, an organisational chart should be provided showing the relationship of the nominee to the applicant and end users.

Radiation Safety Officer

This is an individual appointed by the applicant to supervise radiation safety in relation to the sources for which the licence is sought. This person must be technically competent in radiation protection matters relevant to all sources, including non-ionising radiation sources if these are part of the application. Evidence of competency should be included. If there is more than one radiation safety officer, the details of other radiation safety officers should also be provided.

Note 2: A RSO may not always be required. Applicants should refer to Regulatory Guide: Plans and Arrangements for Managing Safety or contact ARPANSA. 

Declaration 

The declaration must be signed by the applicant or authorised person.

Section B: Description of the source and proposed dealing  

Indicate the kind of controlled apparatus and/or controlled material in the table provided. If there is any doubt about the hazard category or description of a source the applicant should seek advice from Regulatory Services on (02) 9541 8333. 

Describe the source, the proposed dealing, and provide the full site address where sources will be used or stored.

Section C: Source details

Section 47 of the Regulations sets out the information that must be provided about the sources to be dealt with under the licence. This must include the information shown in the table below. 

A dealing with a sealed source(a) the nuclide, activity, chemical form, encapsulation material and physical form of the sealed source
(b) the purpose and identification details of the sealed source
(c) the place where the sealed source is to be located
(d) a copy of any sealed source certificate for the sealed source
A dealing with an unsealed source(a) the nuclide, chemical form and physical form of the unsealed source
(b) the purpose and identification details of the unsealed source
(c) the maximum activity of each nuclide to be held on particular premises at any one time
(d) the place where the unsealed source is to be located
A dealing with a controlled apparatus that produces ionizing radiation(a) the purpose and identification details of the controlled apparatus
(b) the maximum kilovoltage
(c) the place where the controlled apparatus is used
A dealing with a controlled apparatus that produces non ionizing radiation(a) the purpose and identification details of the controlled apparatus
(b) the likely exposure levels including the nature of the radiation
(c) all output parameters relevant to the likely exposure conditions
(d) the place where the controlled apparatus is used

The details of all sources should be recorded in a source inventory workbook (SIW) which is an Excel spreadsheet available here. This is the form approved by the CEO for maintaining source records. 

An explanation of terms and required information appears in the first worksheet. The completed SIW must be submitted with the application.

Section D: Plans & arrangements for managing safety 

The applicant must have plans and arrangements for managing sources to ensure the health and safety of people and protection of the environment. These should be a comprehensive program of policies and procedures that demonstrate how radiation safety will be ensured. The content of these plans and arrangements will vary depending on the hazard and complexity of the sources to be dealt with. 

There is no pre-determined format for supplying this information. The applicant may either describe the plans and arrangements on the application form or may reference suitable organisational documents. If the latter option is taken, the applicant must clearly indicate on the application form where the relevant information can be found within accompanying documents.  

A brief description of what is expected in plans and arrangements is provided below. For more detailed information, refer to Regulatory Guide: Plans and Arrangements for Managing Safety

Applicants should identify the codes and standards relevant to the proposed dealing and describe how these will be implemented or taken into account in managing the safety of sources. This information may be incorporated into Section D.  

Codes and standards applicable to each kind of source can be found here. These codes and standards will become conditions of licence should the application be approved. 

ARPANSA publishes information about international best practice (IBP) with links to international codes and standards that may be relevant to the proposed dealing. The applicant is advised to consider these where relevant.  

Depending on the type of source, the applicant may be required to address some or all of the following:

Effective Control Arrangements

Provide information to demonstrate how the applicant or nominee will maintain control over the particular dealings for which a licence is sought. The arrangements should cover such things as organisational arrangements, management systems and resources.

Safety Management Plan

Describe the administrative arrangements for managing safety. These arrangements may be minimal, where only low hazards are involved, but will be more extensive for dealings of higher hazard or complexity. The safety management plan should cover things such as safety culture, safety of premises and equipment, competency and training, incidents, auditing and record keeping. 

Radiation Protection Plan

Radiation protection policies and procedures should be set out in a radiation safety manual and in specific operating procedures. Guidance on the content of such a manual is provided in chapter 3 of RPS C-1 Code for Radiation Protection in Planned Exposure Situations

The radiation protection plan should cover issues such as principles of radiation protection, planning and design of the workplace, classification of work area, local procedures, radiation monitoring of individuals and the workplace and protection of the environment.  

Where sources are to be used for medical purposes, the plans and arrangements should address the requirements of RPS C-5 Code for radiation protection in medical exposure and associated safety guides for diagnostic and interventional radiology, radiotherapy, and nuclear medicine; in particular, optimisation of exposure and radiation protection of the patient. 

In addition, the applicant is responsible for ensuring that arrangements are implemented for the appointment of a suitably qualified radiation safety officer and/or radiation safety committee as appropriate. Information should be provided about the qualifications and experience of such persons and the arrangements in place for their continued competency. 

Radioactive Waste Management Plan

A full description and anticipated amounts of any radioactive wastes, including discharges arising from the proposed dealing and the arrangements for the safe handling, treatment, storage and disposal of any such waste should be set out in a radioactive waste management plan. 

Refer to RPS C-6 Code for Disposal of Waste by the User

Ultimate Disposal or Transfer Plan

Provide a plan for the ultimate transfer or disposal of sources. Copies of documented undertakings by other organisations to accept sources when no longer required should be provided where possible. Applicants should note that after a licence is issued, section 65 of the Regulations applies to the disposal and transfer of sources. 

Note 3: Stricter requirements apply to security enhanced sources - applicants should refer to the RPS 11 Code of Practice for Security of Radioactive Sources.

Security Plan

Describe the arrangements for the security of sources to prevent theft, damage or unauthorised access. These arrangements should ensure that control of sources is not relinquished without appropriate approvals required in the Regulations and conditions of licence.  The plan should provide for periodic inventory checks to confirm that all sources are secure and in their assigned location.

Refer to RPS 11 Code of Practice for Security of Radioactive Sources. Compliance with this code is mandatory for security enhanced sources - in particular the need for an approved security plan.  

Note 4: A security enhanced source is a radioactive source or aggregation of sources assigned Security Category 1, 2 or 3 when using the methodology set out in Schedule B of RPS 11.   

Emergency Plan

Emergency arrangements must be developed for all foreseeable emergencies such as dispersion of materials, overexposure of operators, or theft or loss of controlled material. The arrangements should include the responsibilities of all parties in the event of an emergency, contact arrangements, emergency procedures, emergency equipment and reporting arrangements. Where necessary, arrangements for involving external agencies such as police and other emergency services should be included.

The plan should include arrangements for testing the emergency arrangements through regular reviews and exercises and rectifying any deficiencies found in the emergency plans. 

Refer to RPS G-3 Guide for Radiation Protection in Emergency Exposure Situations.

Section E: Matters to be taken into account by the CEO

Subsection 33(3) of the Act requires the CEO to take into account international best practice in relation to radiation protection and nuclear safety when making a decision whether to issue a source licence. The CEO must also take into account the matters prescribed in section 53 of the Regulations. Provide information on these matters in Section E for the CEO to consider.

International best practice in radiation protection and nuclear safety 

Describe how international best practice (IBP) has been considered in relation to the facility relevant to the type of authorisation sought. 
Each element of the proposed activity should be researched to determine what can be regarded as IBP. Undertaking research and benchmarking exercises are a useful way to establish IBP.   
Implementation of relevant national and international codes and standards is considered a demonstration of best practice.  

Refer to the International Best Practice page for further information.     

Undue risk 

Provide information to demonstrate that sources can be dealt with without undue risk to the health and safety of people and the environment. This should include evidence that the radiation risks to people and the environment arising from the proposed dealing have been fully assessed, including the probability and magnitude of potential exposures arising from incident scenarios and abnormal occurrences.  

Net benefit 

Provide information to demonstrate that dealing with sources produces sufficient benefit to individuals or to society to offset the radiation harm that it might cause, taking into account social, economic and other relevant factors; that is, the applicant must justify the dealing and demonstrate a net benefit from it.

Optimisation of protection

Provide information to demonstrate that protection has been optimised. The level of protection should be the best under prevailing circumstances and should provide for an adequate margin of benefit over harm. Information should show that the likelihood of incurring exposures, the number of people exposed and the magnitude of exposures are as low as reasonably achievable, having regard to economic and societal factors. Information such as actual dose information, including dosimeter readings and surveys or sample dose calculations or both could be provided for this purpose.     

Technical, human and organisational factors

Provide information to demonstrate that interactions between technical, human and organisational factors have been considered in the management of safety.  

Human factors involve understanding human capability and limitations in operational and maintenance roles relating to sources. There are a variety of human factors assessments that can be used to both understand and demonstrate the management of safety critical risks. 

Organisational factors are aspects of the organisation that facilitate performance (in safety), eg. culture, safety management systems, leadership, resilience, defence-in-depth. Organisational factors can be addressed through a variety of self-reflective practices and systemic design.

Technical factors include the design, operation and maintenance of equipment, machinery and tools. It is important the organisation thinks about the ways in which humans will respond, adapt, and learn from organisational and technical factors.

Guidance on what interactions to consider and questions to ask can be found in the Holistic Safety Guide and Holistic Safety Guide (sample questions).

Capacity to comply 

Provide information to demonstrate that the applicant has the capacity to comply with the Regulations and licence conditions that would be imposed under section 35 of the Act.  

Evidence of compliance with similar legislation such as that administered by Comcare or the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) may be useful for this purpose.  A current ARPANSA licence holder may refer to their compliance history.   

Provide information to demonstrate that there are sufficient financial and human resources to safely deal with sources. 

Authorised signatory 

The application must be signed by an office holder of the applicant or a formally authorised person. An office holder is the Secretary, Chief Executive Officer or an equivalent person of the Department or entity that is named as the applicant. Where a person authorised by an office holder of the applicant signs the application, a copy of the instrument of authorisation must be provided.

Checklist

A checklist is provided to confirm the application is complete.

Application fee

Refer to section 49 of the Regulations to determine the appropriate fee. The fee must be received before the application can be assessed. Accepted payment methods are EFT, credit card or BPAY – please see Payment methods.

Submitting your application

Send completed application form and all supporting documentation to licenceadmin@arpansa.gov.au.

How your application will be processed

When your application is submitted it will be examined to see if all the necessary information is included, if it is properly signed, and if the correct application fee has been paid. If so, you will receive an acknowledgment email. If any of the basic information is missing you will be contacted for further information or in some cases the application and fee may be returned.

Your application will then be forwarded to a regulatory officer. The regulatory officer will discuss and agree a time with you to complete the assessment. 
The regulatory officer will review all the information and consider the claims, evidence and arguments presented. Where matters require clarification, the regulatory officer will contact you or your nominee. The regulatory officer may also consider that an inspection or site visit is necessary and will contact you to arrange. The officer will then prepare a regulatory assessment report to document the review. 

The assessment report will make a recommendation to the CEO about whether to issue a licence and may recommend licence conditions to be imposed under section 35 of the Act. The report undergoes a rigorous review and approval process prior to being sent to the decision maker with all relevant documentation. You will be advised in writing of the decision. 

Under section 37 of the Act, a licence may be issued indefinitely or for a period specified in the licence. When issued a licence remains in force until it is cancelled or surrendered or the specified period has elapsed.

Appealing a licence decision

Section 40 of the Act describes the rights of review available to eligible persons in respect of licence decisions made by the CEO. The following decisions are reviewable:

  • to refuse to grant a licence
  • to impose conditions on a licence
  • to suspend a licence
  • to cancel a licence
  • to amend a licence 
  • not to approve the surrender of a licence
  • to issue a licence for a particular period, rather than for a longer period or indefinitely
  • not to extend the period for which a licence was issued

An eligible person in relation to a decision to refuse to grant a licence means the person who applied for the licence, and in relation to any other licence decision, it is the licence holder.

Review by the Minister

Should an applicant wish to have a licence decision reviewed, the applicant may request the Minister for Health to review the decision. The request must be in writing and be given to the Minister within 28 days of the making of the licence decision.  Once a request for review has been lodged, the Minister must reconsider the licence decision and confirm, vary or set aside the decision.

The Minister is taken to have confirmed the licence decision if the Minister does not give written notice within 60 days of the request.

Review by the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART)

An application may be made to the ART for review of a decision of the Minister.
 

 

Regulatory Guide - Plans and arrangements for managing safety (ARPANSA-GDE-1735)

ARPANSA’s expectations for how a licence holder or applicant will manage the safety and security of facilities and sources

Introduction

This guide sets out ARPANSA’s expectations for how a licence holder or applicant will manage the safety and security of facilities and sources.

Under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (the Act) and Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Regulations 2018 (the Regulations), licence holders must develop and follow their own plans and arrangements to manage safety.  This requirement is consistent with Principle 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Fundamental Safety Principles SF-1 which states that ‘the prime responsibility for safety is with the person or organisation responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.’

Sections 46 and 47 of the Regulations set out the information that is required in a licence application; this includes plans and arrangements that describe how the applicant proposes to manage the safety of the facility or source. Further information that the CEO may request will vary depending on the type of application but may also include siting, design or construction plans, operating limits and conditions, preliminary or final safety analysis report, source identification and location details, etc.  

The CEO must be satisfied that the information provided demonstrates that the proposed conduct (for a facility) or proposed dealing (for a source) can be carried out without undue risk to 

the health and safety of people and the environment. For facilities, this information will be collated in a safety case. The safety case is the collection of scientific, technical, administrative and managerial arguments and evidence in support of the safety of a facility, covering the suitability of the site and the design, construction and operation; the assessment of radiation risks and assurance of the adequacy and quality of all of the safety related work that is associated with the facility. 

A major component of the safety case is the safety assessment, which includes the safety analysis. Important elements of the safety assessment are radiological impact on humans and the environment, site and engineering aspects, operational safety, non-radiological impacts and the management system. The safety analysis is the evaluation of the potential hazards associated with a facility or activity, documented in a safety analysis report (SAR). The safety case with its supporting safety assessment provides the basis for demonstrating safety for licensing purposes. 

The arrangements in place to establish and manage a facility or activity, and the interdependencies between such arrangements, should be documented in a management system. A management system designed to support the object of the Act will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, societal and economic elements. 

The management system should foster and promote a culture for safety and security, which takes into account human factors such as attitudes and behaviour, as well as the general mindset by which all workers, including senior management, approach safety. These factors should interact with the technological and organisational factors in a way that promotes holistic safety (often referred to as systems safety), which is considered a best practice approach to safety management. A holistic approach to safety ensures the technology is safe to use; people perform tasks safely at work; and the organisation overall is managed safely.

Once a licence is issued and an applicant becomes a licence holder, section 60 of the Regulations requires the licence holder to comply with their plans and arrangements. Changes to plans and arrangements that will have significant implications for safety can only be made after the licence holder has sought and obtained approval from the CEO of ARPANSA under section 63 of the Regulations. Changes unlikely to have significant implications for safety do not need prior approval but must be reported to the CEO within three months under section 64 of the Regulations. Under section 61 of the Regulations, the licence holder must, at least every three years, review their plans and arrangements and keep and maintain records of the review and any changes.

Scope and Purpose 

This Guide is applicable to both sources and facilities. Its purpose is to outline those key aspects that should comprise an organisation’s plans and arrangements for managing safety. It should be applied to the extent practicable and commensurate with the degree of hazard associated with the conduct or dealing. For example, the plans and arrangements for a complex facility will be different to those for a low hazard source. A graded approach is important to ensure that efforts and resources are directed to the matters that are most significant for protection of health and safety of people and the environment.

This Guide may be useful to applicants or licence holders to draft, modify or review some or all of their plans and arrangements.

ARPANSA will take this Guide into consideration when:

  • assessing an applicant’s plans and arrangements when submitted as part of a licence application.
  • assessing and monitoring licence holders’ compliance with the requirement to update any plans and arrangements for managing controlled facilities, controlled material or controlled apparatus under section 61 of the Regulations.
  • assessing requests for approval to make a change with significant implications for safety under section 63 of the Regulations.
  • overseeing general compliance through inspections, site visits, meetings, etc.

ARPANSA has drawn on international best practice to prepare this Guide. Where appropriate, links to trusted international standards and additional guidance are provided; applicants are expected to take these into account when developing and reviewing their plans and arrangements.

Structure

This Guide has eight chapters, based on sections 46 & 47 of the Regulations. Links to additional ARPANSA guidance and international standards are provided at the end of each chapter.

  1. Effective Control
  2. Safety Management 
  3. Radiation Protection
  4. Radioactive Waste
  5. Ultimate Disposal or Transfer (for source licences only)
  6. Security
  7. Emergency
  8. Environment Protection

1. Effective Control

Statutory and regulatory compliance

Statutory and regulatory compliance underpin all operations.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

1.1    The processes or systems that will allow all relevant and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to be identified.
1.2    How important statutory and regulatory compliance aspects will be shared and communicated to relevant personnel.
1.3    How all operations and functions will be in compliance with the identified requirements.
1.4    How the licence holder will ensure it stays up-to-date with applicable regulatory requirements.

Management commitment

Management is committed to maintaining safe and secure operations and work environment.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

1.5    Management’s support, promotion and endorsement of the plans and arrangements and their use throughout the organisation1.
1.6    Management’s commitment to: 

  • ensuring compliance with statutory and regulatory obligations
  • allocating adequate resources to safety and security
  • maintaining control over the source or facility

1.7    Management’s commitment to the principles of holistic safety:

  • human aspects and human performance
  • organisational aspects including safety culture and organisational learning
  •  
  • technological aspects
  • interactions between technical, human and organisational factors in the management of safety

1.8    How management’s commitment to the aforementioned will be clearly understood by all staff and promulgated across the organisation.

Accountabilities and responsibilities

Accountabilities and responsibilities are identified for all key functions and operations.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

1.9    Accountabilities and responsibilities, including delegations, are clearly defined and described for: 

  • the overall management of the plans and arrangements are clearly defined2
  • all conducts, dealings and operations and maintaining control over the source or facility
  • safety and security
  • statutory and regulatory compliance
  • resources
  • process implementation

1.10    Accountabilities and responsibilities are mapped out clearly for each section, branch and division.3
1.11    Systems are in place to ensure staff are fully aware of their own accountabilities and responsibilities and also those of other staff.

Resources

Resources are adequately allocated and controlled.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

1.12    The systems in place to identify resource requirements.
1.13    How the organisation’s resources will be controlled.
1.14    How radiation protection and nuclear safety will be considered in allocation of resources.
1.15    The systems used to track and monitor resources.
1.16    The systems used to review resource allocations if circumstances change to ensure continued safety and security of operations. 

Communication

Information is effectively communicated throughout the organisation.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

1.17    Communication needs and requirements have been identified.
1.18    How communication processes and infrastructure will be maintained or put in place to address this need.
1.19    What modes of communication all staff, including contractors, are expected to use4.
1.20    How all staff, including contractors, is able to communicate information with radiation protection and nuclear safety implications efficiently and effectively. 

Process implementation

Operations, processes, functions and activities are adequately controlled.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

1.21    There is a consistent method or approach to develop, approve and roll-out new processes and operations, or review existing ones.
1.22    The systems that will be used to encourage all staff, including contractors, to follow and adopt this method or approach.
1.23    How staff and stakeholder consultation will be included or involved in process development and implementation.
1.24    How process implementation will be monitored and controlled.

Documentation and document control

Documentation is organised and effectively managed.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

1.25    All processes, both administrative and practical, with implications for safety or security, is carried out in accordance with written procedures. 
1.26    All conducts, dealings and operations with implications for radiation protection and nuclear safety are adequately documented and periodically reviewed.
1.27    There are criteria, methods or manuals outlining what specific processes and operations need to be documented5.
1.28    There are systems in place to ensure documents are integrated and consistent with one another6.
1.29    The systems used to ensure documents are quickly and easily accessible staff (including contractors) who need them.
1.30    Documents are managed in an appropriate quality system (preferably accredited). 

Footnotes to Chapter 1

1 For example, this could be demonstrated by the CEO signing them.

2 For example, this should be someone who has ultimate responsibility for the plans and arrangements.

3 For example, this could be an organisational chart showing the organisational structure. 

4 It should be noted that these modes may vary depending on safety and security needs.

5 For example, which operations require procedures, instructions, workflows, SOPs.

6 For example, methods clearly link to overarching organisational policies (vertically) and methods which describe operations integrate with one another (horizontally). Having a method, proforma or ‘document manual’ would help with this process, as is commonly applied by other organisations.

For IBP relevant to effective control see:  International best practice | ARPANSA particularly GSR Part 2 Leadership and Management for Safety and other IAEA publications.

2. Safety Management

Safety policy and objectives

Overarching policies and objectives for safety are clearly defined.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

2.1    An adequate overarching safety policy exists related to all functions, operations, conducts and dealings.
2.2    Safety objectives are clearly outlined7.
2.3    How all staff will be encouraged to fully adopt the safety policy and objectives and how the CEO (or management equivalent) will endorse their use.
2.4    The systems to ensure the safety policy and objectives will be communicated and understood by all staff8.
2.5    The systems to ensure the policy will be monitored, reviewed and kept up-to-date. 

Monitoring and Measurement

Operations are tracked, monitored and measured.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

2.6    Processes used to collect safety data, including from incidents, accidents, exceedances, events, tests, walk-downs, assessments, observations, reports, audits, comments and suggestions.
2.7    Processes in place to observe, assess and promote a good safety culture.
2.8    The systems, processes or infrastructure that is used to report and communicate safety data.
2.9    What type of safety data that will be collected i.e. reactive and predictive data.
2.10    Clear systems or processes used to encourage reporting and communication of data.
2.11    How this data and other safety related data will be securely collected, stored and analysed (see Risk Assessment and Mitigation below regarding analysis of data).
2.12    How differences between how things are done versus how they are described will be identified9.
2.13    How hazards throughout all operations, conducts and dealings will be identified.

Risk assessment and mitigation

Risks are reduced to acceptable levels by applying risk assessment and mitigation strategies.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

2.14    The process by which safety and security data collected from monitoring and measurement is assessed.
2.15    This assessment process enables safety and security data to be filtered and assessed according to the risk.
2.16    The systems to ensure staff designated to conduct this risk assessment have appropriate experience, knowledge and competence.
2.17    There is a threshold or criteria that determine when deviations from an expected outcome are investigated.
2.18    How investigations will take place and how they will be conducted. This should include investigations of breaches required under section 57 of the Regulations. 
2.19    Methods are clearly outlined for conducting investigations and how personnel with sufficient knowledge, experience and competence will be involved.
2.20    Processes are in place to develop control measures for risks that warrant mitigation.
2.21    Implementation of risk mitigation measures according to change control and process implementation guidelines and procedures (see 'Managing Change' below and also Process Implementation under Effective Control). 

Managing change

Changes are safely managed.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

2.22    A formal change management policy and process is in place.
2.23    How the need and objective for change will be identified or established.
2.24    The systems or processes used to develop options to meet this change objective.
2.25    How each option’s safety benefits, detriments and risks will be evaluated and compared.
2.26    How the preferred option(s) will be identified.
2.27    How plans to effectively implement the preferred option(s) are developed and how these plans are consistent with process implementation guidelines or instructions. 
2.28    The systems or processes to ensure that the implemented change will be controlled and monitored so that safety is maintained and not degraded.
2.29    How the whole change process will be reviewed to ensure the change has been effective in meeting its radiation protection and nuclear safety objectives.

Learning and continuous improvement

Learning from experience and continuous improvement underpin all operations.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

2.30    A policy or procedures are in place to ensure learning and continuous improvement occurs for all operations (including security and emergency preparedness and response).
2.31    The systems, processes or performance criteria used to determine when operations or functions are reviewed for the purpose of learning and continuous improvement. 
2.32    How the review will take place and who will be involved. 
2.33    The systems or processes that will allow the learning processes to be identified and shared across the organisation, where applicable10
2.34    How improvements identified through the above processes will be implemented in a controlled manner.
2.35    How audit processes will be in place to ensure these improvement are actually being implemented on the shop floor, resulting in continuous improvement.

Training and education

Staff are provided with appropriate safety training and education programs.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

2.36    The systems or processes used to identify and determine the competency requirements for operations with safety implications.
2.37    How safety training needs for staff (and their respective role and job functions) will be identified to maintain and meet these competency requirements. Training programs should be informed by performance assessment and should be periodically reviewed for effectiveness.
2.38    An adequate plan, program or method exists to ensure these training requirements continue to be met, such as succession-planning or refresher training.
2.39    There is a systematic process for developing, approving and reviewing training to ensure it is effective and continues to meet operational needs.
2.40    The systems or processes used ensure the content and delivery of the training involves stakeholder consultation, takes into account adult learning styles and other relevant factors so that the training is effective.
2.41    How training records for all staff will be controlled, monitored and kept up-to-date.

Footnotes to Chapter 2

7 These are the aims the organisation has with respect to safety.

8 An example could be that this is prominently displayed to staff.

9 This is equivalent to work as done versus work as imagined. It is important to evaluate this because it helps identify drift in operations i.e. both local and organisational operations and functions.

10 For example, this could include learning from deviations or any other functioning which the organisation can learn from for the purpose of improving operational safety and security.

Additional ARPANSA guidance:
For IBP relevant to safety management see:

3. Radiation Protection

Principles of radiological protection

The fundamental principles of optimisation, justification, limitation are taken into account.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

3.1    Conducts and dealings are justified, that is, they must produce a net benefit to the exposed individual or the community, taking into account social, economic and other relevant factors.
3.2    The normal exposure of individuals must be limited so that neither the total effective dose nor the total equivalent dose to relevant organs or tissues, caused by the possible combination of exposures from conducts and dealings, exceeds any relevant dose limit specified in the Regulations.
3.3    For any conduct or dealing under the licence holder or applicant’s control, protection and safety must be optimised so that the magnitude of individual doses, the number of people exposed and the likelihood of incurring exposures are kept as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), taking into account economic and social factors.  For each radiation source, the level of radiation protection provided is optimised so that both individual and collective (normal and potential) exposures are kept ALARA.
3.4    The optimisation of the protection and safety measures associated with any particular conduct or dealing must be subject to dose constraints, the value of which is agreed by ARPANSA. Selection of dose constraints should be based on international best practice. 
3.5    Provisions for appropriate reference levels11 above which some specific actions or decisions are taken. The reference levels may include recording levels, investigation levels, action levels, and intervention levels (see also Section 7: Emergency).
3.6    The consideration of wildlife (plants and animals) in their natural habitats. Protection should be subject to a screening dose rate for wildlife of 10 µGy/h for a conservative assessment.  If this is exceeded, species-specific optimisation is required based on observed effects data in the form of Environmental Reference Levels (see Section 8: Environment Protection Plan).
3.7    Exposure to non-ionising radiation is kept below relevant exposure limits and to the lowest level that can be achieved, consistent with best practice.

Radiation safety officer 

A suitably qualified radiation safety officer (RSO) is appointed as appropriate, to undertake specific duties in relation to radiation protection and nuclear safety.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

3.8    A RSO has been appointed if:

  • The annual doses have the potential to exceed 10% of the limits prescribed in the Regulations
  • The conduct involves a controlled facility
  • The dealing involves Group 2, Group 3 or hazardous non-ionising radiation sources (eg Class 4 lasers) 

3.9    The RSO has operational duties that are clearly specified in the radiation protection plan.
3.10    The RSO has sufficient knowledge of the Act and Regulations, relevant codes of practice, such as the ARPANSA Radiation Protection Series, Radiation Health Series, relevant Australian Standards and other guidance material and information relevant to the duties of the RSO, to facilitate the achievement of best practice for the conduct or dealing being undertaken.

Radiation safety committee 

A suitably qualified radiation safety committee (RSC) is appointed as appropriate, to undertake specific duties in relation to radiation protection and nuclear safety. 

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

3.11    A RSC has been established if any of the following are met:

  • The conduct or dealing has multiple activities involving controlled facilities, controlled apparatus and controlled material, or is spread over a number of premises.
  • The annual doses of ionising radiation from any conduct or dealing at any of the premises has the potential to exceed 10% of the limits specified in the Regulations.
  • There is potential exposure to non-ionising radiation above the limits specified in Schedule 1 of the Regulations.

3.12    The RSC has functions that are clearly specified in the radiation protection plan.
3.13    The RSC acts as an administrative and consultative body that reviews the radiation protection plans and policies for all conducts and dealings within the organisation and recommends to the licence holder or applicant the radiation protection policy that should be implemented.
3.14    The RSC is of size and membership determined by the type and size of the organisation using controlled facilities, controlled apparatus and controlled material.
3.15    The RSC meets at regular intervals (eg. quarterly) and hold special meetings to review important safety issues as required.
3.16    The RSC deputises persons for the Chair, the Secretary/Executive Officer and the RSO if any of them is unable to attend a meeting.
3.17    The RSC has standing orders relating to a quorum of members which would normally consist of at least one half of the committee membership including the Chair (or their deputy) and the RSO (or their deputy).
3.18    The RSC has a standard agenda item for the RSO to present a report on the state of radiation protection in the organisation.
3.19    The RSC keeps minutes of the RSC meetings that should be ratified at following meetings of the RSC.
3.20    The RSC forwards a copy of the RSC minutes to the senior management of the organisation.
3.21    The RSC establishes and maintains a channel of communication with the work health and safety committee of the organisation (if one exists).
3.22    The RSC undertakes consultation with controlled person and visitors who may be exposed to radiation in their work, and with controlled persons’ representatives, where appropriate.

Planning and design of the workplace

Design of the workplace is optimised for radiation protection consistent with international best practice12

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

3.23    The planning, design and construction of the workplace where conducts and dealings are undertaken is in compliance with trusted international standards. 
3.24    The workplace has been planned and designed to ensure that:

  • Doses, including effective dose and equivalent dose, are in compliance with prescribed dose limits and are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), economic and social factors being taken into account, and that appropriate dose constraints have been used.
  • For each radiation source, the level of radiation protection provided is optimised so that both individual and collective (normal and potential) exposures are kept ALARA.
  • Exposure to ionising radiation is in compliance with a source related dose constraint of 10% of the effective dose limits specified in the Regulations (or another percentage agreed with the CEO).
  • Exposure to non-ionising radiation is kept below relevant exposure limits to the lowest level that can be achieved.

3.25    Priority is given to engineering controls (including ventilation, interlocks and shielding) to minimise reliance on administrative controls and personal protective equipment.

Classification of work areas

Work areas are classified in accordance with ARPANS legislation and trusted international standards.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

3.26    Areas are classified as controlled areas wherever:

  • There exists a potential for significant internal or external exposure from radiation or contamination.
  • It is required to control normal exposures or prevent the spread of contamination during normal working conditions.
  • Measures are required to prevent or limit the extent of potential exposures.

3.27    Controlled areas are delineated by physical means or, where this is not reasonably practicable, by some other suitable means.
3.28    Suitable warning symbols and appropriate instructions are displayed at access points and other appropriate locations within controlled areas.
3.29    Appropriate occupational protection and safety measures are established for each controlled area, including the provision of local rules and procedures.
3.30    The following items are provided, as appropriate, at exits from controlled areas:

  • equipment for monitoring for contamination of skin and clothing
  • equipment for monitoring for contamination of any object or substance being removed from the area
  • washing or showering facilities
  • suitable storage for contaminated protective clothing and equipment

3.31    Supervised areas should be: 

  • delineated by appropriate means
  • indicated by approved signs at appropriate access points 
  • reviewed periodically to determine any need for protective measures and safety provisions, or changes to the boundaries

Local rules and procedures

Local rules and procedures are implemented for protection and safety of workers and other persons.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

3.32    Implementation of local rules and procedures that describe:

  • Person responsible for radiation safety, and emergency arrangements in the event of an accident and/or incident
  • Accountability of sources
  • Managing criticality safety as applicable
  • Decontamination 
  • Calibration and maintenance of equipment 
  • Investigation level or authorised level, and measures to be followed in the event that any such level is exceeded

Personal protective equipment

Adequate and appropriate personal protective equipment is provided.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

3.33    Controlled persons and visitors are provided with adequate and appropriate personal protective equipment which meets relevant standards or specifications, including:

  • protective clothing
  • protective respiratory equipment for which the protection characteristics are made known to the user
  • protective aprons, gloves and organ shields

3.34    Controlled persons and visitors receive adequate instruction in the proper use of respiratory protective equipment, where appropriate, including testing for good fit.
3.35    Tasks requiring the use of some specific personal protective equipment are assigned only to controlled persons who on the basis of medical advice are capable of safely sustaining the extra effort necessary.
3.36    All personal protective equipment is maintained in proper condition and tested at regular intervals.
3.37    Appropriate personal protective equipment is maintained for use in the event of intervention.

Monitoring of the workplace

Regular radiation and contamination monitoring of the workplace is conducted where appropriate.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

3.38    A workplace monitoring program is established, maintained and regularly reviewed under the supervision of a RSO.
3.39    Workplace monitoring includes, as appropriate:

  • Leak and wipe tests
  • External ionising radiation levels
  • Surface contamination levels
  • Airborne contamination monitoring levels
  • Readily accessible exposure levels for non-ionising radiation.

3.40    Standard operating procedures are adhered to when workplace monitoring surveys are performed.
3.41    All monitoring instruments are calibrated periodically as required and the calibration of instruments checked prior to use.
3.42    Written reports are prepared following each workplace survey and made available to controlled persons.
3.43    Reports are referred to appropriate persons and any non-routine occurrences are investigated and appropriate action taken.
3.44    How survey results are analysed for risks and trends (See Risk Assessment and Mitigation).

Monitoring of individuals

Individuals monitoring and assessment of exposure to controlled persons and visitors.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

3.45    That there is a clear, evidence-based rationale for the decision whether or not to implement a system of individual monitoring. 
3.46    Individual monitoring is undertaken where appropriate and is adequate and feasible for any controlled person who is normally employed in a controlled area, or who occasionally works in a controlled area and may receive significant exposure.
3.47    Where individual monitoring is inappropriate, inadequate or not feasible, the exposure of the controlled person is assessed on the basis of the results of monitoring of the workplace and on information on the locations and duration of exposure of the controlled person.

3.48    The nature, frequency and precision of individual monitoring is determined with consideration of the magnitude and possible fluctuations of exposure levels and the likelihood and magnitude of potential exposures.
3.49    Controlled persons who enter and work in controlled and supervised areas are required to wear appropriate dosimetry devices (eg whole body exposure dosimeters, extremity exposure dosimeters, direct reading dosimeters, personal air samplers).
3.50    Visitors who enter controlled or supervised areas are required to wear a direct reading dosimeter and be accompanied by a controlled person.
3.51    Dosimetry devices are worn in the correct location and manner.
3.52    Controlled persons and visitors who may be exposed to radioactive contamination are identified and appropriately monitored (eg by bioassay and whole body monitoring) to demonstrate the effectiveness of the protection provided and to assess the intake of radioactive substances or the committed doses.
3.53    Equivalent, effective and collective doses received by controlled persons and visitors are assessed and collated.
3.54    Individual and collective doses are monitored and reviewed on a regular basis by the RSO and/or RSC.
3.55    Abnormal dose results are reported and investigated and actions are taken to avoid recurrence.
3.56    Exposures to non-ionising radiation received by controlled persons and visitors are assessed, including the determination of parameters which affect the exposure.

Monitoring of the environment

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring that plans and arrangements are in place and are implemented for the monitoring of the environment where appropriate.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

3.57    All potential exposure pathways to the natural environment have been identified, including direct effects to wildlife in their natural habitats.
3.58    The level of potential exposure has been assessed for all potential exposure pathways.
3.59    Pathway analysis and relevant calculations are performed for each potential exposure pathway.
3.60    Where ongoing environmental monitoring is not considered necessary for a specific potential exposure pathway, this decision must be justified by appropriate analysis and calculations.
3.61    For those potential exposure pathways where exposure levels could be significant, an ongoing environmental monitoring regime is established, maintained and regularly reviewed.
3.62    The environmental monitoring regime complies with relevant standards and codes and is in accordance with international best practice.

Transport

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring that arrangements are implemented for the safe transport of controlled apparatus and controlled material, both on and off site, in compliance with the ARPANS legislation and international standards and codes.

Plans and arrangements for off-site transport should demonstrate compliance with the following where appropriate:

NOTE: ARPANSA does not administer the 1ADG Code or DGR however compliance is considered best practice and will be required by state and territory regulators for goods entering or passing through their jurisdictions.

Plans and arrangements for on-site transport should demonstrate:

3.63    The non-fixed contamination on the external surfaces of any package is kept as low as practicable and under the routine conditions of transport not exceeding the following limits averaged over any area of 300 cm2 of any part of the surface:

  • 4 Bq/cm2 for beta and gamma emitters and low toxicity alpha emitters 
  • 0.4 Bq/cm2 for all alpha emitters

3.64   Use of a designated vehicle with appropriate labels and placards, as required.
3.65    A radiation safety officer is consulted if the surface dose of a package exceeds 2 mSv/hr to ensure appropriate arrangements are implemented including use of an over pack.  
3.66    The integrity of shielding material used in the package design is maintained during on-site transport.
3.67    Any packages that are not certified by the Competent Authority13 use standard engineering design and proven technology.
3.68    Nuclear criticality safety is maintained and health physics coverage is provided for any package used for transport of fissile material. 
3.69    Appropriate contamination clearance certification procedures.  
3.70    Appropriate response to leakage, breakage, or abnormal occurrence.
3.71   In the case of spent fuel and fissile material, appropriate consideration and analysis of accident conditions.
3.72    Maintenance of all records of on-site transport including non-conformance and abnormal occurrences in an appropriate quality format. 

Footnotes to Chapter 3

11 Diagnostic Reference Levels are used in medical imaging. The use of ionising radiation in medicine is covered by RPS C-5 Code for Radiation Protection in Medical Exposure (2019). See also the associated Safety Guides: 

12 For controlled facilities applicants or licence holders should refer to other regulatory guides specifically for facilities on the ARPANSA website.

13 The CEO of ARPANSA is the Competent Authority for the transport of radioactive material by a Commonwealth entity and/or controlled person (as defined in section 13 of the Act) by road, rail and inland waterways within Australia. 

Additional ARPANSA Fundamentals and Codes relevant to radiation protection:
For IBP relevant to radiation protection see: 

 

4. Radioactive Waste

Management of radioactive waste

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring that all radioactive waste (including gaseous and liquid discharges) arising from conducts and dealings, existing and anticipated, is appropriately managed.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

4.1    A description of the arrangements for the safe handling, treatment, transport, storage and ultimate transfer or disposal of any waste arising from all past, current and proposed conducts and dealings.
4.2    A full description of the physical, chemical and radiological properties of the waste (including gaseous and liquid discharges) arising from all past, current and proposed conducts and dealings.
4.3    Arrangements for the minimisation of radioactive waste generation.
4.4    Processes for the collection, segregation, characterisation, classification, treatment, conditioning, storage and disposal of radioactive waste.
4.5    Provision for the safe handling of waste by having appropriate handling equipment and selecting short and uncomplicated routes.
4.6    An assessment is performed of the integrity of waste control measures to ensure that they are fault tolerant.
4.7    If fissile material is present, documentation (including calculations) to assess whether criticality is possible. If criticality is possible, documentation detailing the provisions for ensuring that criticality cannot occur. (See also Local Rules and Procedures 3.32)
4.8    Compliance with the requirements of appropriate statutory authorities and any local regulations (eg. Trade Waste Agreements).

Limiting exposure to radioactive waste

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring that exposure levels to radiation workers and members of the public are limited during the handling, treatment, transport, storage and transfer or ultimate disposal of radioactive waste.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

4.9    Identification of all credible exposure pathways for all radioactive waste.
4.10    How exposure is limited during handling, treatment, transport, storage and transfer or ultimate disposal of all radioactive waste.
4.11    Processes for monitoring and assessing results to show that discharges are within specified limits.  These procedures must clearly specify the following:

  • A reference to the method used for deriving the limits for the particular discharge pathway
  • The method of keeping records to show that these limits are not exceeded
  • Actions to be taken when radioactive waste discharges approach or exceed the discharge limit.

4.12    Documented system for demonstrating and reporting compliance with discharge limits based on the following:

  • The monitoring of discharges
  • Environmental monitoring results
  • Dose assessments, including independent checking of results and use of conservative methods and modelling.

Packaging and containment of radioactive waste

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring that radioactive waste arising from all conducts and dealings is packaged and contained to minimise the potential for migration or dispersion of radionuclide and to limit the external dose rate to within acceptable limits. 

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

4.13    Provision of appropriate waste handling and packaging areas and facilities.
4.14    Documented procedures to ensure that containers are clearly labelled with the radiation warning sign, a description of the radioactive contents (ie. the radionuclide and form of the waste), the activity when packaged, the date of packaging and the name of the person who is to be contacted for further information or in the event of an abnormal occurrence.
4.15    Documented procedures for performing and recording dose rate measurements at the surface of each package and at one metre from the surface of each package to ensure compliance with the maximum allowable dose rates.
4.16    Provision of non-flammable spillage trays (with 2.5 times the volume of waste) for containers of liquid waste.

Storage of radioactive waste

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring that all radioactive waste arising from existing and anticipated conducts and dealings is stored safely.  The licence holder or applicant is also responsible for ensuring that all such stores are adequately sited, designed, constructed, operated, secured and maintained to allow for the optimisation of provision of safe custody of the waste packages, and for the protection of persons, property and the environment from radiological hazards associated with radioactive waste.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

4.17    Arrangements for storage of radioactive waste consider suitable provisions for safety and security including: 

  • Location and adequate storage capacity
  • Suitability of the package for the type of storage and for the foreseeable time frame of storage
  • Use of adequate engineering controls (e.g. shielding, ventilation, monitoring equipment) and administrative controls (e.g. local rules and procedures) 
  • Documented procedures for inspection, maintenance and monitoring  
  • Documented procedures for managing criticality safety for waste containing fissile material

Documentation of radioactive waste

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring that documentation detailing the nature of any radioactive waste arising from conducts and dealings, its location, and all safety and security procedures is maintained.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

4.18    Procedures for ensuring that an accurate inventory is kept of all waste packages and containers and their contents.  An adequately maintained register or database should include:

  • The radionuclide type/content (physical, chemical and radiological characteristics)
  • The chain of custody (including details of acceptance, movement, storage, discharge and disposal)
  • The waste matrix used for immobilisation
  • The treatment or conditioning method
  • The ID number of the package (ie. a unique package designator).

4.19    Maintenance of documentation detailing any local government, State or Territory approvals and requirements which the licence holder or applicant is obliged to follow.

Routine discharge of radioactive waste to the sewer

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring that all radioactive waste arising from existing and anticipated conducts and dealings that is to be discharged to the sewer is disposed of safely.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

4.20    Arrangements to ensure that the limits imposed by state or local water authorities are not exceeded. This may include a system for holding liquid waste in tanks to allow decay prior to disposal.

Routine discharge of radioactive waste to the atmosphere

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring that all radioactive waste arising from existing and anticipated conducts and dealings that is to be discharged to the atmosphere is disposed of safely.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

4.21    A system to ensure that discharge of radioactive waste to the atmosphere does not exceed statutory limits.

Additional ARPANSA guidance:

For IBP relevant to radioactive waste management see: International best practice particularly GSR Part 5 Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste and other IAEA publications.

5. Ultimate Disposal or Transfer 

Management of ultimate disposal or transfer

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring that all radioactive waste arising from existing and anticipated conducts and dealings is ultimately disposed of or transferred in an appropriate manner.
 

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

5.1    Documented procedures to ensure that details of any radioactive waste to be ultimately disposed of or transferred are provided to ARPANSA.
5.2    Compliance with the following where appropriate:

5.3    Documentation showing undertakings by other organisations to accept responsibility for controlled apparatus and controlled material when no longer required by the licence holder.
5.4    Provision for consultation with local government and other relevant authorities on all matters connected with ultimate disposal of controlled facilities, controlled apparatus and controlled material.

ARPANSA guidance:

For IBP relevant to ultimate disposal or transfer see: International best practice

6. Security

Security procedures

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring arrangements are made and implemented for the security of controlled facilities, controlled apparatus and controlled material, to prevent unauthorised access, damage, theft, loss or unauthorised use. The arrangements should include administrative and physical controls and barriers to ensure that the control of these items is not relinquished or improperly transferred, taking account of any relevant requirements imposed by the ARPANS legislation and, where applicable, the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office.

General security 

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

6.1    International Standards14 that reflect international best practice for nuclear security are taken into account and the interfaces between security and safety have been considered.  
6.2    Procedures ensure that all conduct and dealings with controlled materials, controlled apparatus and controlled facilities are in accordance with RPS 11 Code of Practice for the Security of Radioactive Sources
6.3    Periodic reviews of inventories to confirm the category or aggregated category of sources in their designated locations. 
6.4    Reasonable steps have been taken to ensure such security plans and arrangements are implemented.
6.5    Appropriate security for storage, use and transport (as applicable) of controlled apparatus and controlled material, including:

  • Details of the storage location 
  • Description as to the authorised use of the source
  • Provision of a suitable temporary storage area in the event of off-site dealings
  • Provision of a secure storage area for any radioactive waste awaiting disposal.

6.6    Security plans are updated in a timely fashion in accordance with regulatory requirements; or as necessary to address issues or changes in threat environment identified in the threat assessment. 
6.7    Records are kept of any changes made to the security plans and arrangements.
6.8    Clearly defined lines of responsibility for security and of authority for decision-making in matters of security of controlled facilities, controlled apparatus and controlled material.
6.9    A description of arrangements for the provision of security and response to security threats, including: scalable procedural and administrative security measures to meet increased levels of threat. 
6.10    Appropriate back-up of security documentation and maintenance of computer security.

Security enhanced sources

Plans and arrangements for security category 1, 2 & 3 sources15 or facilities containing such sources should demonstrate:

6.11    Compliance with the requirements of RPS 11 Code of Practice Security of Radioactive Sources in particular, a Security Plan (as prescribed by Schedule A1) that includes:

  • A description of the source including details such as isotope, activity and the date of measurement, serial number and physical and chemical form.
  • A description of the radiation practice for which the source is used and the categorisation of the source calculated in accordance with the methodology set out in Schedule B.
  • A description of the specific location of the source in the building or facility where it is used or stored.
  • A plan of the building or facility in which the source is used or stored including the physical security measures used to protect the source and a definition of the secure area for the purposes of Schedule D.
  • Allocation of responsibilities for security to competent and qualified persons with appropriate authority to carry out their responsibilities.
  • A description of the specific security concerns to be addressed, for example theft or sabotage, or mechanical or electronic failure of a physical security measure.
  • A description of the physical security systems that will be used to address the security concerns and meet the requirements of the Code.
  •  
  • A description of the procedural security measures that will be used to address the security concerns and meet the requirements of the Code.
  • Arrangements for review and revision of the Source Security Plan, including maximum time between reviews in accordance with regulatory requirements.
  • Measures to effectively respond to a malicious act consistent with the threat.16
  • The threat assessment developed by the Australian government in consultation with the regulatory body should be used as a common basis for determining security requirements, and evaluating security measures implemented by the operator.17
  • To the extent possible, that security measures during a response to a nuclear security event do not adversely affect the safety of the personnel.

Plans and arrangements for controlled facilities including nuclear installations18 should include:

6.12    Arrangements for protection against unauthorised removal of nuclear material, noting that: 

  • Nuclear material is radioactive material, which also requires protection against unauthorised removal where there are potentially significant consequences if dispersed or otherwise used for a malicious purpose. Protection requirements against unauthorised removal of nuclear material for potential subsequent offsite radiological exposure or dispersal are provided in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities.
  • Physical protection measures in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 should be additional to, and not a substitute for other measures established for nuclear safety, nuclear material accountancy and control or radiation protection purposes.19

6.13    When a facility contains nuclear material and other radioactive material, the physical protection requirements for both should be considered and implemented in a consistent and non-conflicting manner to achieve an adequate level of security.

In such cases, the more stringent requirements for physical protection should be applied.  

NOTE: Levels of protection defined in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 are based on categorisation of nuclear material for use in the construction of a nuclear explosive device.20 The physical protection of nuclear material against unauthorised removal for use in a nuclear explosive device and the physical protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage are addressed in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5).

International Standards

6.14    International Standards may also be used by ARPANSA in assessing plans and arrangements for the security of radioactive material, associated facilities and activities for the prevention of malicious acts intended or likely to cause harmful radiological consequences. International standards provide additional guidance on elements of a security plan and emphasise a regulatory responsibility to verify compliance with the security plan.21 When a facility contains both nuclear material and other radioactive material, the protective requirements of an number of international standards should be considered and implemented in a manner such that the more stringent requirement for physical protection are applied.22

Footnotes to Chapter 6

14International best practice - nuclear security

15 The security category is calculated according to methodology in Schedule B of RPS 11 Code of Practice Security of Sources 

16 Nuclear Security Series No. 14 Paragraph 3.33

17 Nuclear Security Series No. 14 Paragraph 4.2

18 ‘Nuclear Installations’ as defined in Section 13 of the ARPANS Act (1998)

19 Nuclear Security Series 13 Paragraph 3.17

20 Nuclear Security Series No. 13 Paragraph 4.2

21 Nuclear Security Series No. 14 paragraphs 4.20 and 4.21 and IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 paragraph 3.27 provide further guidance on the elements of a security plan

22 Nuclear Security Series No. 13 Paragraph 1.15 and IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14 Paragraph 1.16

For IBP relevant to security see International best practice

7. Emergency

Emergency plans

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for providing detailed emergency plans for any conduct or dealing that could give rise to a need for emergency intervention.  This plan should be based on an assessment of the consequences of reasonably foreseeable accidents or incidents, and should aim to minimise the consequences and ensure the protection of on-site personnel, the public and the environment.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

7.1    Emergency plans for any conduct or dealing which could give rise to a need for emergency intervention which are consummate with the Emergency Preparedness Category for the facility from RPS G-3 Guide for Radiation Protection in Emergency Exposure Situations.
7.2    Identification of the various operating and other conditions which could lead to the need for intervention.
7.3    Identification of potential incident and accident situations in terms of the hazard, the personnel at risk, and the consequences of potential accidents including environmental impact.

7.4    Classification of potential emergencies in terms of their consequences.
7.5    Suitable intervention and action levels are defined for the relevant protective actions taking into account the possible degrees of severity of accidents that could occur.
7.6    Consideration of a range of intervention measures.
7.7    Identify emergency zones for emergency planning purposes by defining responses to a localised dispersal of radioactive material; or radiological release from a facility.
7.8    The degree of emergency planning is commensurate with the nature and magnitude of the risk, and the feasibility of mitigating the consequences should an accident occur.
7.9    The emergency plan is coordinated with those plans and arrangements prepared by other relevant bodies that have radiological emergency response responsibilities in a nuclear or radiological emergency.
7.10    Responsibilities are specified for the management of interventions on-site, off-site and 
across state and national boundaries, as appropriate, in all separate but interconnecting plans.
7.11    Integration of emergency plans with other plans and arrangements such that safety and security measures do not contradict each other in emergency situations.
7.12    Intervening organisations have been involved in the preparation of emergency plans as appropriate.
7.13    Allocation of responsibilities for notifying the relevant authorities and for initiating intervention.
7.14    Identification of methods and instruments for assessing the accident and its consequences on and off the site.
7.15    The content, features and extent of emergency plans take into account:

  • The results of any accident analysis
  • Any lessons learned from operating experience
  • Any lesson learned from accidents that have occurred with conducts or dealings of a similar type.

7.16    Training and retraining arrangements for personnel involved in implementing the emergency plans.
7.17    Arrangements for public information releases in the event of an accident.
7.18    Provision for the early prediction or assessment of the extent and significance of any accidental discharge of radioactive substances to the environment.
7.19    Provision for rapid and continuous assessment of the accident, and determine the need for protective actions as the accident proceeds.
7.20    Provision for dissemination of information to members of the public who could reasonably be expected to be affected by the emergency both prior to and during the emergency.
7.21    Provision for protection and mitigation actions, and assigned responsibilities for initiating and discharging such actions.
7.22    Criteria for terminating each protective action are defined.
7.23    Defined actions to be taken during restoration.
7.24    Compliance with current legislation and national and international agreements including reporting to ARPANSA.
7.25    The emergency plan is reviewed and updated regularly taking into consideration the results of the emergency exercises.

Emergency procedures

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring that comprehensive emergency procedures are prepared in accordance with the objectives of the emergency plan for any conduct or dealing which could give rise to the need for emergency intervention.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

7.26    A statement describing the potential emergency situation to which each procedure applies.
7.27    A statement of purpose for each procedure. 
7.28    An organisational structure where the lines of authority and the functions of all individuals who will respond to an emergency are clearly defined.
7.29    The communication arrangements for contacting any relevant on-site personnel and intervening organisations, and for obtaining assistance from fire-fighting, medical, police and any other relevant organisations. 
7.30    The actions needed both during emergency and during restoration after the emergency including: 

  • A description of appropriate intervention and action levels
  • A description of the action sequence to achieve the purpose of the procedure
  • Specification of the precautions and limitations during the performance of the prescribed tasks
  • Specification of guidelines to be followed in the exercise of judgement on the part of an individual, either in interpretation of results, action levels, or recommendations of protective actions.
  • Take into account human performance in demanding circumstances.

7.31    The training requirements for all personnel involved in implementing the emergency plans.
7.32    Copies of examples of forms to be used in carrying out tasks relevant to the procedures.
7.33    Where appropriate, sign-off sheets, checklists and data sheets to document completion of the actions prescribed in the procedures.
7.34    A list of the emergency response facilities and equipment for use in the case of an accident (including radiation monitoring instruments, sampling and counting equipment, personnel dosimeters, personal protective equipment, decontamination supplies, emergency control rooms, communication facilities, maps, facility floor plans and reference material).
7.35    Provisions for all actions related to emergency preparedness (see 7.36 – 7.42).

Emergency preparedness

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring that all organisations identified in the emergency plan are prepared for such emergencies, and that adequate facilities and equipment are available and maintained. 

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

7.36    An appropriate rostering system and back-up procedure is in place to ensure that emergency personnel are always available.
7.37    The emergency plan is exercised regularly to:

  • Test emergency equipment
  • Test the adequacy of on-site personnel resources
  • Ensure that personnel understand their responsibilities and relationships within their organisation; and procedures for interfacing with Intervening Organisations.
  • Test communications and communication equipment
  • Test evacuation procedures and evacuation routes
  • Confirm the viability of intervention measures to protect off-site personnel and the environment
  • Confirm the availability of suitable public information systems
  • Confirm the availability of external facilities, including those for the provision of medical aid to treat injured and/or radioactively contaminated persons
  • Test the emergency response interface with government, local authorities and off-site agencies.

7.38    Regular retraining of personnel is carried out in each organisational unit involved in the emergency plan.
7.39    Emergency contact lists and procedures are regularly reviewed and updated.
7.40    Emergency response facilities (including communications) are maintained.
7.41    Calibrated monitoring and sampling equipment for use in the case of an emergency is available.
7.42    A records management system has be established and maintained in relation to emergency arrangements to a radiological emergency in order to allow for their review and evaluation. 

Additional ARPANSA guidance:
For IBP relevant to emergency planning and preparedness:

8. Environment 

Protection of wildlife

The licence holder or applicant is responsible for ensuring that arrangements are in place to demonstrate radiation protection of wildlife (plants and animals) in their natural habitats is consistent with international best practice.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

8.1    Radiation protection of wildlife in their natural habitats has been considered in parallel with radiation protection of people.
8.2    Wildlife populations and ecosystems are shown to be protected using an environmental radiological assessment, consistent with the methodology outlined in RPS G-1 Guide for Radiation Protection of the Environment that: 

  • Considers dose rates to wildlife above natural and normal background level.
  • Applies a graded approach that is as simple as possible, but as complex as necessary.
  • Demonstrates characterisation of the radiological source.
  • Identifies all potential exposure scenarios and pathways to the environment and affected biota.
  • Is based on the concept of reference organisms.
  • Documents assumptions made and limitations in methodologies and data, including uncertainties.

8.3    Environmental radiological assessments of wildlife in their natural habitats should be initially benchmarked to a screening dose rate of 10 µGy/h.  The screening assessment should be conservative. 
8.4    Where the screening dose rate is exceeded a more complex assessment is required that:

  • Uses less conservative consumptions or site-specific data.
  • Discusses population size and species likely to be affected, as well as potential impacts on biodiversity.
  • Is compared to an environmental reference level (ERL) for each affected species type which is based on knowledge of biological effects in wildlife related to dose rate.  

8.5    Where a complex assessment still identifies incremental dose rates to wildlife above ERL(s) then further optimisation, including possible mitigation measures, may be required. 

ARPANSA Guidance RPS G-1 Guide for Radiation Protection of the Environment

9. Decommissioning Plan

Decommissioning refers to administrative and technical actions taken to allow removal of some or all of the regulatory controls from a facility (except for a radioactive waste disposal facility, which is, by definition, subject to closure and not decommissioning). Such actions involve decontamination, dismantling and removal of radioactive materials, waste, components and structures. They are carried out to achieve a progressive and systematic reduction in radiological hazards and are taken on the basis of planning and assessment to ensure safety during decommissioning operations. 

While much of the decommissioning activity takes place in the final phase in the lifecycle of the facility, planning for decommissioning nominally begins during facility design and continues through all phases of the facility lifecycle. Experience has shown the importance in considering decommissioning for new facilities at the design stage, developing an initial decommissioning plan, and periodically updating the initial decommissioning plan during and at the conclusion of the operational phase. The subsequent objective is to develop a final decommissioning plan prior to the start of decommissioning activities.

Plans and arrangements should demonstrate:

  • Consideration of relevant safety and regulatory aspects
  • Application of a graded approach
  • Selection of an appropriate decommissioning strategy
  • Development and review of decommissioning plans
  • Radiation protection for decommissioning
  • Safety assessment
  • Adequate funding and resources
  • Decommissioning management
  • Transition from operation to decommissioning
  • Termination of authorisation.

Specific guidance including the content of a decommissioning plan is provided in ARPANSA Regulatory Guide: Decommissioning of Controlled Facilities.

For IBP relevant to decommissioning see:  

Regulatory Guide - Disposal of Sources (ARPANSA-GDE-1733)

 

Associated forms

Purpose of this guide

This regulatory guide sets out ARPANSA’s expectations for the disposal of: 

Explanation of terms

In this guide the generic meaning of ‘disposal’ is used. It includes the transfer of controlled apparatus and controlled material (collectively referred to as sources) to another ARPANSA licence holder or to a person/organisation outside of ARPANSA’s jurisdiction.

The term ‘source’ is used to collectively mean controlled apparatus and controlled material.   

A ’security enhanced source’ means a radioactive source or aggregation of sources assigned the Category 1, 2 or 3 when using the methodology set out in Schedule B of Code of Practice for the Security of Radioactive Sources (RPS 11).

Introduction

Section 65 of the Regulations provides 4 disposal options:

  1. The licence holder may dispose of controlled material or controlled apparatus with prior approval from the CEO
  2. The licence holder may without approval of the CEO transfer the controlled apparatus or controlled material to another licence holder under certain conditions
  3. The licence holder may without approval of the CEO dispose of the controlled apparatus by returning certain controlled apparatus to the supplier of the controlled apparatus in certain circumstances  
  4. The licence holder may without approval of the CEO dispose of certain controlled apparatus by rendering the controlled apparatus permanently inoperable as a controlled apparatus in certain circumstances.

Under option 2, prior approval is not required to transfer a source to another ARPANSA licence holder provided:

  • both entities hold an appropriate licence issued by the CEO of ARPANSA,
  • the apparatus does not contain a security enhanced source, and
  • the licence holder disposing of the apparatus tells the CEO about the transfer within 7 days.

A Source Transfer Notice must be submitted within 7 days of the transfer.

Where a licence holder routinely disposes of sources as part of routine operations the CEO of ARPANSA can make a special arrangement in the licence under subsection 65(5) of the Regulations so there is no need to seek prior approval to dispose of each source.  

Note: Temporary transfer of sources to a service agent for repair or maintenance is not a disposal as ownership is retained by the licence holder.  In such cases the licence holder must ensure that the service agent has appropriate training in radiation safety and training with respect to such activities (as required by all licences). 

Disposal of controlled apparatus

As defined in section 13 of the Act, controlled apparatus means any of the following:

  1. An apparatus that produces ionising radiation when energised or that would, if assembled or repaired, be capable of producing ionising radiation when energised
  2. An apparatus that produces ionising radiation because it contains radioactive material
  3. An apparatus prescribed by the regulations that produces harmful non-ionising radiation when energised.

Disposal of controlled apparatus often includes destruction or dismantling.

Disposal of controlled apparatus requires prior approval from the CEO of ARPANSA unless the licence makes other arrangements under subsection 65(5) of the Regulations OR the disposal meets the conditions described in paragraphs 65(1)(c) & (d) for certain controlled apparatus.  This allows Group 1 controlled apparatus to be returned to the supplier or rendered permanently inoperable without prior approval provided it does not contain controlled material.

To satisfy the CEO of ARPANSA of the ‘destruction’ of a controlled apparatus it must be rendered inoperable in such a way that only expert knowledge and the use of specialised components could potentially restore its function. 

In most cases, removal of a critical component(s) and severing the power cables will render the apparatus inoperable. For example: 

  • In the case of x-ray apparatus, eliminating the vacuum inside the x-ray tube by breaking the glass envelope and severing the high-tension cables will effectively destroy the apparatus.  
  • In the case of lasers removing the power supply, critical optical components or the amplifying medium will render the apparatus inoperable. 

In all cases, the licence holder must take into account the presence of other hazardous materials, for example: beryllium, mercury, cadmium, etc. The licence holder should seek guidance from their local environmental agency on disposal requirements for such material or investigate possible recycling options.  

Once destroyed, the apparatus ceases to meet the definition of a controlled apparatus and is therefore no longer subject to regulatory control. Individual dismantled parts are not deemed to be controlled apparatus.

If apparatus is to be disposed of because it has ceased to function, a critical component should still be removed so that repair is not possible.

In the case of apparatus containing radioactive material, removal of the material means the apparatus is no longer ‘controlled’.  However, depending on the activity of the material removed, it may still be subject to regulatory control and need to be authorised by a licence. 

Where disposal to landfill is proposed, the licence holder should ensure that the removed critical components are discarded separately to the rest of the apparatus unless they are to be retained as spare parts. This is to prevent any chance of them being recombined or repaired. Recycling should be considered where possible.

Transfer a source out of ARPANSA's jurisdiction

Sources are often sold, leased, hired, or given away to a person or organisation in another jurisdiction - such action is regarded as a ‘transfer’. This includes the return of controlled material to the original manufacturer or supplier in another jurisdiction or in some cases overseas.  

In the majority of cases prior approval is required for a source to leave ARPANSA’s jurisdiction.  However, paragraph 65(1)(c) of the Regulations provides for certain Group 1 controlled apparatus to be returned to the supplier without prior approval as noted above.    

Particular attention is required when proposing to dispose of multiple low activity sources in a single shipment. The activity of all sources must be aggregated (using the method in Schedule B of RPS 11) to determine if additional security arrangements apply.

 

Additional requirements for security enhanced sources:

Licence holders must be aware of the additional security arrangements for security enhanced sources, in particular the requirement for an endorsed transport security plan – see RPS 11 (para 5.3)

It is important that receipt of the source is confirmed at its final destination particularly if overseas.   

If the final destination is outside Australia the licence holder must ensure that the required documentation is completed noting that an ARPANSA Export Permit is required for the export of high activity sources. For the definition of a high activity source and information about how to apply for an export permit please see Export permits | ARPANSA.

Transfer a security enhanced source to another ARPANSA licence holder

Under RPS 11 (2.1.11) the transfer of a security enhanced source must have prior approval from the CEO even if the transfer is between ARPANSA licence holders.

Licence holders must comply with the additional security requirements, in particular the requirement for an endorsed transport security plan as per para 5.3 of RPS 11.  

How to apply for approval to dispose of a source

Licence holders seeking approval to dispose of a source should use the Request for approval to dispose of a source. Completed forms should be sent to licenceadmin@arpansa.gov.au.

Licence holders must comply with their obligations under the following codes:

Follow up actions

Maintaining an accurate inventory

Following physical disposal, the status of the source in the source inventory workbook (SIW) should be changed to ‘Transferred’ or ‘Disposed’ and the date recorded.   

Reporting compliance 

Compliance reports submitted by licence holders must include summary information about disposals that have occurred during the reporting period. This includes disposals that did not require prior approval to ensure that databases are updated.    

 

   

 

Regulatory Guide - How to seek an exemption from a licence (ARPANSA-GDE-1737)

Introduction

Section 30 of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 prohibits certain activities in relation to controlled facilities. Section 31 of the Act prohibits any dealing with controlled material or controlled apparatus unless the activity or dealing is authorised by a facility or source licence as appropriate, or is prescribed in Part 5 Division 2 of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Regulations 2018 (the Regulations) as exempt. 

Section 43 of the Regulations describes exemption of controlled persons from requirements for a facility licence for conduct relating to a controlled facility. This refers to Section 30(1)(g) of the Act.

Section 44 of the Regulations describes certain dealings with controlled apparatus and controlled material that are exempt. Schedule 1 Part 1 of the Regulations sets out exempt activity and activity concentration values for specific radionuclides. The Regulations do not prescribe any controlled facility as exempt.

In addition to the exemptions prescribed in the Regulations the CEO may also exempt from the need to be licensed those activities in relation to controlled facilities that require a licence under section 30 and those dealings with controlled material or controlled apparatus that require a licence under section 31.The CEO’s powers to exempt are derived from the following parts of the Regulations: 

  • Subsection 9(2) for apparatus that produces harmful non ionising radiation when energised prescribed under subsection 9(1) 
  • Subsection 13(2) for radiation facilities prescribed under subsection 13(1) 
  • Subsection 43(2) for one or more conducts specified in paragraph 30(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (ea) of the Act in respect of a specified controlled person and in relation to a particular controlled facility
  • Subsection 44(3) for controlled material or controlled apparatus that produce ionising radiation 

The criteria that the CEO will use to determine if an exemption is to be granted and the matters that will be taken into account are explained below.  

1. Apparatus that produces harmful non ionising radiation when energised  

Subsection 9(1) of the Regulations prescribes those apparatus that produce harmful non-ionising radiation and which require a licence from ARPANSA under section 31 of the Act. However, under subsection 9(2) the CEO may declare in writing that a particular non-ionising radiation apparatus is not a controlled apparatus thereby removing the requirement for a licence.

Under subsection 9(3) the CEO must not make a declaration under subsection 9(2) unless the CEO is satisfied that:

(a) the apparatus does not pose an unacceptable hazard to the health and safety of people or to the environment; or

(b) it would be inappropriate for the apparatus to be a controlled apparatus.

A controlled person seeking a declaration under subsection 9(2) must provide sufficient evidence for the CEO to make a declaration that the apparatus meets the respective criteria under paragraphs (a) and (b) above in normal or routine conditions as well as under all reasonably foreseeable abnormal events or conditions.  

Note: Dealings with controlled apparatus that can produce non-ionising radiation that are prescribed in the table in subsection 44(1) are exempt. 

2. Prescribed radiation facilities 

Subsection 13(1) of the Regulations prescribes those facilities that are for the purposes of the Act ‘prescribed radiation facilities’ (PRFs). These controlled facilities require a licence for any of the conducts specified in paragraphs 30(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (ea).  However under subsection 13(2) the CEO may declare in writing that a particular facility is not a PRF thereby removing the requirement for a licence.

Under subsection 13(3) the CEO must not make a declaration under subsection 13(2) unless the CEO is satisfied that:

a) the facility does not pose an unacceptable hazard to the health and safety of people or to the environment; and

b) it would be inappropriate for the facility to be a prescribed radiation facility.

A controlled person seeking a declaration under subsection 13(2) must provide sufficient evidence for the CEO to make a declaration that the facility meets the respective criteria under paragraphs (a) and (b) above in normal or routine conditions as well as under all reasonably foreseeable abnormal events or conditions.  

3. Conduct by a particular controlled person in relation to a particular controlled facility 

Subsection 43(2) of the Regulations provides the CEO the power to exempt any of the conducts mentioned in paragraph 30(1)(a), (b), (c), (d) (e) or (ea) of the Act by a particular controlled person in relation to a particular controlled facility (including any future conduct by the controlled person in relation to the controlled facility) provided the conduct does not or will not pose an unacceptable potential hazard to the health and safety of people or to the environment.

A controlled person seeking a declaration under subsection 43(2) must provide sufficient evidence for the CEO make a declaration that the conduct for which the exemption is sought will not pose an unacceptable potential hazard to the health and safety of people and the environment in normal or routine conditions as well as under all reasonably foreseeable abnormal events or conditions.

Note that unlike subsection 13(2), which gives the CEO the power to declare that a particular controlled facility is not a PRF (e.g. a portable neutron generator), subsection 43(2) gives the CEO the power to exempt a controlled person from the need to be licensed to undertake a particular conduct in relation to a particular controlled facility (e.g. decommission a linear accelerator).

4. Controlled material or controlled apparatus that produces ionising radiation

Dealing with a controlled apparatus or controlled material that can produce ionising radiation that is prescribed in section 44(1) is exempt. However, even if a controlled apparatus or controlled material is not listed in section 44(1), subsection 44(3) provides for the CEO to make a declaration under subsection 44(4) or 44(5) for certain low-dose or low-risk dealings, thereby exempting those controlled apparatus or controlled material. The CEO will only make such a declaration if satisfied of certain matters prescribed in the respective subsection. 

1. To seek an exemption under subsection 44(4) for a low-dose dealing, an applicant must make a written submission to the CEO and demonstrate that for the particular dealing for which an exemption is sought:

a) the annual effective dose to an individual during normal operations is not likely to exceed 10 μSv; or

b) an accident, misuse or exceptional circumstance affecting the dealing is not likely to produce an annual effective dose greater than 1 mSv.

Any submission for an exemption under paragraph 44(4)(a) should consider annual effective doses for:

  • normal use
  • accident scenarios
  • ultimate disposal scenarios
  • routine maintenance scenarios
  • source repair scenarios

To seek an exemption under subsection 44(5) in relation to one of the following:

a)    a radiological emergency or its after-effects

b)    the after-effects of a previous dealing

c)    naturally occurring material or bulk material with a mass more than 1000 kg

the applicant must make a written submission to the CEO and include an assessment of the magnitude of individual doses, the number of people exposed and the likelihood that potential exposure will actually occur justifies the dealing being exempt.

5. Regulatory assessment of a request 

ARPANSA will consider each application on its merits to determine whether the required statutory tests have been met. Decisions will be based on international best practice taking into account studies published by scientific and technology based organisations or other regulatory bodies. The implications of unregulated disposal will also be considered. 

6. Notice of intention to declare an exemption

If the CEO proposes to make a declaration of exemption under subsection 43(2) with respect to a controlled facility the CEO must publish the intention to do so in a daily national newspaper and on the ARPANSA website as soon as practicable. The notice must include either:  

a) a copy of the proposed declaration or

b) a description of the controlled person, the kind of conduct and the controlled facility that are to be the subject of the declaration and any conditions relevant to subsection 43(3). 

If the proposed declaration relates to a nuclear installation the CEO must issue an invitation for public submissions and provide information about the timing and procedures for making submissions.    

7. Publish a declaration of exemption

The CEO must publish a declaration under subsection 9(2), 13(2), 43(2), 44(2), 44(4) or 44(5) on ARPANSA’s website as soon as practicable after making it. 

8. Revoke a declaration of exemption

The CEO may revoke a declaration made under subsection 43(2) if the circumstances under which the controlled facility is owned, possessed or used has changed such that the controlled person can no longer satisfy the statutory tests on which the CEO’s earlier decision was made. 

9. Exception to exemption

Under subsection 44(2) the CEO may declare in writing that a particular dealing described in the table in subsection 44(1) has a risk of excessive dose and is therefore not exempted under subsection 44(1). This decision may be taken when:

(a) the annual effective dose to an individual during normal operations is likely to be greater than 10 μSv; or

(b) an accident, misuse or exceptional circumstance affecting the dealing is likely to produce an annual effective dose greater than 1 mSv.

10. Reviewable decision

A decision by the CEO to refuse to make a declaration under subsection 9(2), 13(2), 43(2) or 44(4) or 44(5) or to make a declaration under subsection 44(2) is reviewable under section 86 of the Regulations.

Licence conditions - Codes and standards applicable to sources (ARPANSA-SUP-1781)

The following abbreviations are used in the table below:

NOTE 1 re periodic self-assessment: ARPANSA strongly encourages licence holders be proactive in their approach to compliance; this includes conducting periodic self-assessments against applicable codes & standards.  

NOTE 2 re international best practice:  In addition to the codes and standards listed below, ARPANSA considers international best practice when making licensing decisions. This includes international standards and guidance that may apply to ionising radiation sources and non-ionising radiation sources. 

NOTE 3 re calibration of monitoring instruments: Although Australian Standard AS/NZS2243.4 requires annual calibration of radiation monitoring instruments, if an instrument is used solely to detect the presence or absence of radioactive contamination, and from which no quantitative information (such as air concentration or surface contamination) is derived, then the frequency of calibration may be extended to a maximum of 5 years.

Group 1

G1-1     Sealed source for calibration purposes of activity of 40 MBq or less

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code;

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G1-2     Sealed source in a fully enclosed analytical device

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G1-3     Sealed source with activity of 400 MBq or less in a fixed gauge

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Radiation Protection Series 13: Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Safe Use of Fixed Radiation Gauges (2007)

G1-4     Sealed source in a blood irradiator

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G1-5     Sealed source in a bone densitometer

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G1-6     Sealed source that is in storage and awaiting disposal and has a nuclide with a maximum activity of not more than 109 times the activity value for that nuclide set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Regulations

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018)

G1-7      Unsealed source, or sources, in a laboratory or particular premises, having nuclides of one kind only with a maximum activity not more than 102 times the activity value for that nuclide set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Regulations

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018) 

G1-8      Unsealed source, or sources, in a laboratory or particular premises, having nuclides such that when the maximum activity of each nuclide in the source, or sources, is divided by the activity value for that nuclide set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Regulations, the total of the results for all nuclides in the source, or sources, is not more than 102.

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018) 

G1-8(a) Radioactive waste in storage awaiting disposal if the result of the activity value division steps for the controlled material is greater than 1 and is not greater than 102

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018) 

G1-9     Mammographic X-ray unit

Medical Exposure Code; Planned Exposure Code

G1-10  Conventional dental X-ray unit

Planned Exposure Code

Radiation Protection Series 10: Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Radiation Protection in Dentistry (2005)

G1-11  X-ray unit used for bone densitometry

Medical Exposure Code; Planned Exposure Code

G1-12  X-ray unit used for veterinary radiography

Planned Exposure Code

Radiation Protection Series 17: Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Radiation Protection in Veterinary Medicine (2009)

G1-13  Fully enclosed X-ray analysis unit

Planned Exposure Code

Radiation Health Series 9: Code of practice for protection against ionizing radiation emitted from X-ray Analysis Equipment (1984)

G1-14  Baggage inspection X-ray unit

Planned Exposure Code

Radiation Health Series 21: Statement on cabinet X-ray equipment for examination of letters, packages, baggage, freight and other articles for security, quality control and other purposes (1987)

Note: Section 5.2 (b) of RHS 21 does not apply to X-ray units to which there is no public access, or where sufficient controls are in place so that insertion of any part of the human body into the primary beam is not possible.

G1-15  Mobile or portable medical X-ray unit

Medical Exposure Code; Planned Exposure Code

G1-16  Magnetic field non-destructive testing device

Radiation Protection Series S-1 (Rev. 1) Standard for Limiting Exposure to Radiofrequency Fields – 100 kHz to 300 GHz (2021)

Australian Standard: Safety in laboratories, Part 5: Non-ionizing radiations - Electromagnetic, sound and ultrasound (AS 2243.5:2024)

ICNIRP Guidelines for Limiting Exposure to Time-Varying Electric and Magnetic Fields 1 Hz - 100 kHz (2010)

ICNIRP Guidelines for Limiting Exposure to Electric Fields Induced by Movement of the Human Body in a Static Magnetic Field and by Time-Varying Magnetic Fields Below 1 Hz (2014)

G1-17  Induction heater or induction furnace

Radiation Protection Series S-1 (Rev. 1) Standard for Limiting Exposure to Radiofrequency Fields – 100 kHz to 300 GHz (2021)

ICNIRP Guidelines for Limiting Exposure to Time-Varying Electric and Magnetic Fields 1 Hz - 100 kHz (2010)

Australian Standard: Safety in laboratories, Part 5: Non-ionizing radiations - Electromagnetic, sound and ultrasound (AS 2243.5:2024)

G1-18  Industrial radiofrequency heater or welder

Radiation Protection Series S-1 (Rev. 1) Standard for Limiting Exposure to Radiofrequency Fields – 100 kHz to 300 GHz (2021)

Australian Standard: Safety in laboratories, Part 5: Non-ionizing radiations - Electromagnetic, sound and ultrasound (AS 2243.5:2024)

G1-19  Radiofrequency plasma tube

Radiation Protection Series S-1 (Rev. 1) Standard for Limiting Exposure to Radiofrequency Fields – 100 kHz to 300 GHz (2021)

Australian Standard: Safety in laboratories, Part 5: Non-ionizing radiations - Electromagnetic, sound and ultrasound (AS 2243.5:2024)

G1-20  Microwave or radiofrequency diathermy equipment

Radiation Protection Series S-1 (Rev. 1) Standard for Limiting Exposure to Radiofrequency Fields – 100 kHz to 300 GHz (2021)

Australian Standard: Safety in laboratories, Part 5: Non-ionizing radiations - Electromagnetic, sound and ultrasound (AS 2243.5:2024)

G1-21  Industrial microwave or radiofrequency processing system

Radiation Protection Series S-1 (Rev. 1) Standard for Limiting Exposure to Radiofrequency Fields – 100 kHz to 300 GHz (2021)

Australian Standard: Safety in laboratories, Part 5: Non-ionizing radiations - Electromagnetic, sound and ultrasound (AS 2243.5:2024)

G1-22  Optical source, other than a laser product, emitting ultraviolet radiation, infra-red or visible light

Australian Standard: Safety in laboratories, Part 5: Non-ionizing radiations - Electromagnetic, sound and ultrasound (AS 2243.5:2024)

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Photobiological safety of lamps and lamp systems (AS/NZS IEC 62471:2011)

Radiation Protection Series 12: Radiation Protection Standard for Occupational Exposure to Ultraviolet Radiation (2006) 

G1-23   Laser product with an accessible emission that exceeds the accessible emission limits of a Class 3R laser product as set out in AS/NZS IEC 60825-1:2014

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety of laser products Part 1: Equipment classification and requirements (AS/NZS IEC 60825-1:2014)

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety of laser products Part 14: A user’s guide (AS/NZS IEC 60825-14:2022)

G1-24   Optical fibre communication system exceeding Hazard Level 3R as defined by AS/NZS IEC 60825-2:2022​​​​​​

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety of laser products Part 2: Safety of optical fibre communications systems (OFCS) (AS/NZS IEC 60825-2:2022)

G1-25   Sealed source not mentioned in another item in this table or in the definition of Group 2 or Group 3, dealings with which do not have the potential for accidental exposure likely to exceed the dose limits mentioned in sections 77 and 79 of the Regulations

G1-25(a)  Sealed source for training and education purposes of activity 40 MBq or less

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G1-25(b)  Manufactured item or component containing thorium

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018) 

G1-25(c)   Item or device containing radium 226 of 1 MBq or less and no other controlled material

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018) 

G1-25(d) Item or device containing promethium 147 of 1 GBq or less and no other controlled material

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018) 

G1-25(e)   Item or device containing tritium of 100 GBq or less and no other controlled material

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018) 

G1-25(f)      Intentionally blank

G1-25(g)    Sealed source in a static eliminator or aerosol neutraliser

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G1-26   Controlled apparatus that produces ionising radiation or non-ionising radiation and is not mentioned in another item of this table or in the definition of Group 2 or Group 3, dealings with which do not have the potential for accidental exposure likely to exceed the dose limits mentioned in sections 77 and 79 of the Regulations

G1-26(a)   Fully enclosed X-ray unit (radiography for special purposes)

Planned Exposure Code

Radiation Health Series 22: Statement on enclosed X-ray equipment for special applications (1987)

G1-26(b)  Portable handheld dental X-ray apparatus

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018

Radiation Protection Series 10: Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Radiation Protection in Dentistry (2005)

G1-26(c)     Intentionally blank
G1-26(d)    Intentionally blank
G1-26(e)    Intentionally blank

G1-26(f)   Dual energy X-ray absorptiometry (DEXA) unit for veterinary studies

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series 17: Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Radiation Protection in Veterinary Medicine (2009)

G1-26(g)  Fully enclosed X-ray biological irradiator (low power)

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G1-26(h)  CT, SPECT/CT or PET/CT scanner for imaging of small animals

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series 17: Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Radiation Protection in Veterinary Medicine (2009)

G1-26(i)      Intentionally blank
G1-26(j)      Intentionally blank

G1-26(k)   Handheld backscatter X-ray security inspection system

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G1-27  Controlled apparatus that produces non-ionizing radiation and is not mentioned in another item of this table

G1-27(a)   Optical source, other than a laser product, emitting ultraviolet  radiation, infrared or visible light - solar tower array

Australian Standard: Safety in laboratories, Part 5: Non-ionizing radiations - Electromagnetic, sound and ultrasound (AS 2243.5:2024)

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Photobiological safety of lamps and lamp systems (AS/NZS IEC 62471:2011)

Note: the following international best practice guidance should also be considered:
ICNIRP Guidelines on Limits of Exposure to Incoherent Visible and Infrared Radiation (2013)

G1-27(b)  Ion beam etching unit
Australian Standard: Safety in laboratories, Part 5: Non-ionizing radiations - Electromagnetic, sound and ultrasound (AS 2243.5:2024)

G1-27(c)   Laser used on animals
Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety of laser products Part 1: Equipment classification and requirements (AS/NZS IEC 60825-1:2014)

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety of laser products Part 14: A user’s guide (AS/NZS IEC 60825-14:2022)

Australian Standard: Safety in laboratories, Part 5: Non-ionizing radiations - Electromagnetic, sound and ultrasound (AS 2243.5:2024)

Radiation Protection Series 17: Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Radiation Protection in Veterinary Medicine (2009)

Group 2

G2-1     Sealed source for calibration purposes of activity of more than 40 MBq

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G2-2     Sealed source in a partially enclosed analytical device

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G2-3     Sealed source of activity of more than 400 MBq in a fixed gauge

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Radiation Protection Series 13: Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Safe Use of Fixed Radiation Gauges (2007)

G2-4     Sealed source in a mobile gauge

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Radiation Protection Series 5: Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Portable Density/Moisture Gauges Containing Radioactive Sources (2004)

G2-5     Sealed source for medical or veterinary diagnostic nuclear medicine use

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Radiation Protection Series 17: Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Radiation Protection in Veterinary Medicine (2009)

G2-6      Unsealed source, or sources, in a laboratory or particular premises, having nuclides of one kind only with a maximum activity of more than 102, but not more than 104, times the activity value for that nuclide set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Regulations

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018)

G2-7      Unsealed source, or sources, in a laboratory or particular premises, having nuclides such that when the maximum activity of each nuclide in the source, or sources, is divided by the activity value for that nuclide set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Regulations, the total of the results for all nuclides in the source, or sources, is more than 102 but not more than 104​​​​

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018)

G2-7(a)  Radioactive waste in storage awaiting disposal, if the result of the activity value division steps for the controlled material is greater than 102 and is not greater than 104

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018)

G2-8     Unsealed sources used for tracer studies in the environment

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018)

G2-9     Industrial radiography X-ray unit

Planned Exposure Code

Radiation Protection Series C-4: Code of Radiation Protection Requirements for Industrial Radiography (2018)

G2-10   Fixed medical X-ray unit, including a unit used for fluoroscopy, tomography and chiropractic radiography

Radiation Protection Series C-5: Code for Radiation Protection in Medical Exposure (2019)

G2-11   Partially enclosed X-ray analysis unit

Radiation Health Series 9: Code of practice for protection against ionizing radiation emitted from X-ray Analysis Equipment (1984)

G2-12   Medical therapy simulator

Medical Exposure Code; Planned Exposure Code

G2-13  CT scanner

Medical Exposure Code; Planned Exposure Code

G2-14   Sealed source of controlled material not mentioned in another item of this table or in the definition of Group 1 or Group 3 dealings with which have the potential for accidental exposure likely to exceed a dose limit mentioned in sections 77 and 79 of the Regulations but unlikely to result in acute effects

G2-14(a)    Sealed source for training and education purposes of activity more than 40 MBq

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G2-14(b)  Item or device containing radium 226 of activity of more than 1 MBq and no other controlled material

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018)

G2-14(c)   Item or device containing promethium 147 of more than 1 GBq and no other controlled material

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018)

G2-14(d)  Item or device containing tritium of more than 100 GBq and no other controlled material

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018)

G2-15      Controlled apparatus that produces ionizing radiation not mentioned in another item of this table or in the definition of Group 1 or Group 3, dealings with which have the potential for accidental exposure likely to exceed a dose limit mentioned in sections 77 and 79 of the Regulations but unlikely to result in acute effects

G2-15(a)   Mobile backscatter X-ray security inspection system

Planned Exposure Code

G2-15(b)  Mobile fluoroscopic X-ray apparatus

Medical Exposure Code; Planned Exposure Code

G2-15(c)   CT scanner for imaging of non-human objects

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Health Series 22: Statement on enclosed X-ray equipment for special applications (1987)

G2-15(d)  Fixed medical X-ray unit used for research purposes, including a unit designed for fluoroscopy, tomography, mammography and chiropractic radiography for use on non-human objects

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G2-15(e)   Personnel security system using backscatter X-rays

Planned Exposure Code

American National Standard: Radiation Safety For Personnel Security Screening Systems Using X-rays or Gamma Radiation (ANSI/HPS N43.17-2009)

G2-15(f)   Orthopantomogram (OPG) (dental panoramic X-ray unit)

Radiation Protection Series 10: Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Radiation Protection in Dentistry (2005)

G2-15(g)   Fully enclosed X-ray biological irradiator

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G2-15(h)  Personnel anti-smuggling screening system using transmission X-rays

Planned Exposure Code

American National Standard: Radiation Safety For Personnel Security Screening Systems Using X-rays or Gamma Radiation (ANSI/HPS N43.17-2009)

G2-15(i)   Handheld X-ray Fluorescence Analyser

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G2-15(j) Portable Deuterium/Deuterium Neutron Generator for materials analysis 

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Group 3

G3-1     Sealed source for industrial radiography

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Radiation Protection Series C-4: Code of Radiation Protection Requirements for Industrial Radiography (2018)

G3-2     Sealed source for medical and veterinary radiotherapy

Security CodeMedical Exposure Code; Transport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Radiation Protection Series C-5: Code for Radiation Protection in Medical Exposure (2019)

Radiation Protection Series 17: Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Radiation Protection in Veterinary Medicine (2009)

G3-3     Sealed source in a bore hole logger

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Radiation Health Series 28: Code of practice for the safe use of sealed radioactive sources in borehole logging (1989)

G3-4      Sealed source not mentioned in another item of this table or in the definition of Group 1 or Group 2, dealings with which have the potential for accidental exposure likely to exceed a dose limit mentioned in sections 77 and 79 of the Regulations and likely to result in acute effects

G3-4(a)  Reactor start-up source

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G3-4(b)  Industrial irradiator containing less than 100 TBq of a controlled material 

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Health Series 24: Code of practice for the design and safe operation of non-medical irradiation facilities (1988)

G3-4(c)  Industrial irradiator containing 100 TBq or more but less than 1 PBq of a controlled material and that is shielded and interlocked 

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Health Series 24: Code of practice for the design and safe operation of non-medical irradiation facilities (1988)

G3-4(d) Sealed source in a fully enclosed and interlocked cabinet used for calibration purposes

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G3-5      Unsealed source, or sources, in a laboratory or particular premises, having nuclides of one kind only with a maximum activity of more than 104, but not more than 106, times the activity value for that nuclide set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Regulations

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018)

G3-6      Unsealed source, or sources, in a laboratory or particular premises, having nuclides such that when the maximum activity of each nuclide in the source, or sources, is divided by the activity value for that nuclide set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Regulations, the total of the results for all nuclides in the source, or sources, is more than 104 but not more than 10​​​​​​6

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018)

G3-6(a)  Radioactive waste in storage awaiting disposal, if the result of the activity value division steps for the controlled material is greater than 104 and is not greater than 106

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018

Radiation Protection Series C-6: Code for Disposal of Radioactive Waste by the User (2018)

G3-7     Veterinary or medical radiotherapy unit

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Radiation Protection Series C-5: Code for Radiation Protection in Medical Exposure (2019)

Radiation Protection Series 17: Code of Practice and Safety Guide for Radiation Protection in Veterinary Medicine (2009)

G3-8      Controlled apparatus that produces ionizing radiation not mentioned in another item of this table and in the definition of Group 1 or Group 2, dealings with which have the potential for accidental exposure likely to exceed a dose limit mentioned in sections 77 and 79 of the Regulations and likely to result in acute effects
G3-8(a)    Intentionally blank

G3-9(b)  Neutron Beam Instrument

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G3-8(c)   Low Energy Implanter

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G3-8(d)  Portable/mobile deuterium-tritium (± deuterium-deuterium) neutron generator

Security CodeTransport CodePlanned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

G3-8(e)    Intentionally blank
G3-8(f)     Intentionally blank

G3-8(g)  X-ray based industrial irradiator

Planned Exposure Code

Australian/New Zealand Standard: Safety in laboratories Part 4: Ionizing radiations (AS/NZS 2243.4:2018)

Radiation Protection Series C-4: Code of Radiation Protection Requirements for Industrial Radiography (2018)

Radiation Health Series 22 - Statement on enclosed X-ray equipment for special applications (1987)

 

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